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ABSTRACT 
For many people their ease of access to a private home toilet means that when and where 
they go to relieve themselves is rarely a deliberation in their minds. In South Africa’s rural 
and peri-urban spaces there are many poor people for whom this is not the case. For these 
people the inadequacy of their access to sanitation compromises their health, safety and 
ability to live a dignified life. Without an explicit right included in the Constitution, litigating 
on access to sanitation poses a formidable legal challenge. However, a critical analysis of 
South Africa’s socio-economic and administrative law jurisprudence reveals that a 
fundamental right of access to sanitation is not exactly necessary. Outlining South Africa’s 
vast network of service delivery legislation and policy, this thesis submits that there is a 
principled basis in our law to enforce a right of access to sanitation. It illustrates that this 
legal basis extends beyond merely protecting a person’s existing access to sanitation, but 
includes positive duties imposed on the state to provide certain services as well.  
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Chapter 1: Sanitation - an introduction 
1.1.THESIS OBJECTIVES 
Developing upon international legal trends it will be shown that there are immediate human 
rights concerns over the lack of access to sanitation within South Africa. Unfortunately, 
South Africa’s Bill of Rights does not enshrine a fundamental right of access to sanitation.1 
Such a right would provide a powerful basis, sourced in the country’s rich constitutional 
jurisprudence, from which to challenge the state to provide for the basic needs of the poor. 
However, despite this not being the case, it is submitted that there is an alternative and 
principled basis in South African law to fashion a similar right.  
It has been over two decades since South Africa has become a constitutional 
democracy and it has since developed a vast network of legislation, supported by policy, 
which seeks to facilitate the provision of basic services. These services include not only the 
provision of housing, electricity and water but sanitation as well. Using this source of law as 
a departure point, it will be shown that where litigants seek to protect their existing access to 
sanitation or otherwise intend to compel the state to provide this essential service, they must 
frame their cause of action with reference to the entitlements that flow from this legislative 
and policy framework. To do so would give effect to what is broadly referred to as their ‘right 
of access to sanitation’. In short, this thesis in an attempt to outline this right and the ways it 
could be protected and realised through litigation.  
1.2. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis was completed using desk based research entirely and studies both primary and 
secondary sources to the extent that they are relevant to those who seek to enforce a right of 
access to sanitation. Although international law is briefly discussed, the primary sources 
relied on are primarily South African case law, legislation and policy whereas the secondary 
sources used consist of government guidelines, scholarly journal articles and books.  
1.3.STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
In this Chapter the international status of sanitation will be discussed. Included within this 
discussion is a brief description of the human rights implications of poor sanitation and what 
the content of a human right to sanitation is considered to be internationally. Furthermore, 
international assessments will be used to gauge how South Africa fares globally in providing 
access to sanitation.  
                                                          
1
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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In Chapter 2 South Africa’s sanitation service delivery record is scrutinised before 
outlining the country’s sanitation related legislation and policy. It will be shown that a right 
access to sanitation comprises of a range of entitlements and, depending on the context, a 
person may enforce access to either basic, interim or a form of adequate sanitation. It is 
concluded that together, these various forms of access comprise what is referred to more 
broadly as a right of access to sanitation.  
Finally, in Chapter 3 South Africa’s first and second wave socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence is discussed critically. It will be shown how the Constitutional Court’s second 
wave jurisprudence is typified by an increased reliance on the procedural aspects of the rights 
enforcement process. This trend presents comparable developments to South Africa’s 
administrative law and it is upon this growing symbiosis that this paper will focus before 
concluding on the judgement of Joseph.
2
 This judgement presents some unique insight into 
the increased proceduralisation of socio-economic rights and delivers the legal framework for 
a so called public law right to sanitation.  
1.4. INTERNATIONAL STATUS 
‘Water is life, sanitation is dignity.’  
Above stands the slogan of South Africa’s Department of Water and Sanitation 
(DWS). The quote, although short and simple, is telling. Without water, a human being 
cannot live. Without sanitation, the quality of a person’s life is compromised. However, the 
provision of access to water and sanitation on a non-discriminatory basis extends to a number 
of human rights beyond life and dignity including, the rights to health, food, education, 
housing and an adequate standard of living.
3
 What the available evidence suggests is that 
where the provision of water and sanitation to a community is poor, it is invariably the case 
that the public health and wellbeing of those who live in such an environment is severely 
compromised.
4
 
Access to clean water is generally necessary for safe hygiene practice and the proper 
use of sanitary facilities. A lack of access to clean water and safe sanitation often presents 
significant risks to certain, sometimes vulnerable, groups of people. Women and children in 
the developing parts of Africa are generally responsible for the provision of their household’s 
water for cooking, cleaning and sanitary purposes. They spend much of their day travelling 
                                                          
2
 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC). 
3
 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), Report on the Right to Access Sufficient Water and Decent 
Sanitation in South Africa (2014) at 36.  
4
 Ibid. 
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great distances through difficult and dangerous terrain to reach the nearest water source.
5
 This 
necessity also means that the collection of water takes precedence over time spent at school 
or otherwise pursuing work opportunities. These circumstances do not fare any better for 
those with disabilities where, even should sanitary facilities be readily accessible to the 
community, these facilities nevertheless fail to structurally accommodate for their particular 
needs.
6
 
Of further concern is the fact that a lack of access to clean water and sanitation places 
additional burdens on the weakened immune systems of people who are HIV positive and 
allows for the proliferation of what would otherwise be preventable diseases like diarrhoea 
and cholera.
7
 Global statistics reveal that as many as 3600 children die daily from diarrhoeal 
diseases due to their relatively weak immune systems and exposure to poor living 
conditions.
8
 In this respect, the substandard management of wastewater treatment facilities 
contributes greatly to these deplorable living conditions, often allowing their sewage outflows 
to release wastewater back into the environment where families wash, drink and live.
9
 
As has been alluded to, those people who lack access to clean water and sanitation 
will also generally be society’s poorest and most marginalised. It has been shown that poor 
people living in the informal settlements of developing countries ordinarily have the least 
affordable access to clean water, often relying primarily on vendor bought bottles for their 
daily drinking, cooking or hygiene needs.
10
 Furthermore, it is almost always these very same 
people who have limited access to a number of other basic and interrelated services, 
including access to adequate housing, health and education.
11
  
Catarina de Albuquerque, a former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human 
right to safe drinking water and sanitation, argues that despite being of fundamental 
importance to our daily existence, sanitation continues to occupy a space of ‘cultural taboo’ 
within most societies. However, the reality is that over a billion people worldwide have little 
to no access to sanitation at all, often defecating in the open fields and streets of their 
communities.
12
  
                                                          
5
 Ibid at 37. 
6
 Ibid.  
7
 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), Sanitation for a Healthy Nation: Questions and Answers 
on the White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation (2002) at 3.  
8
 Catarina de Alburquerque, On the Right Track: Good Practices in Realising the Rights to Water Sanitation 
(2012) at 20.  
9
 Ibid at 19-20.  
10
 Ibid at 20.  
11
 Ibid at 21.  
12
 Ibid at 19.  
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In fact, following De Albuquerque’s report, a recent joint global assessment released 
by UNICEF and the World Health Organisation (WHO) revealed that 2.4 billion people 
worldwide lack access to improved sanitation facilities.
13
 Their assessment defines improved 
sanitation facilities as those which separate human excreta from human contact and are 
therefore considered ‘safe’ by international standards.14 Examples of acceptable facilities 
include flush/flush pour piped sewer systems or pit latrines, ventilated improved pit (VIP) 
latrines, pit latrines with a slab, and composing toilets.
15
 
In light of growing international pressure, human rights to water and sanitation have 
received increasing recognition and protection. Several binding international treaties have 
previously recognised the value and importance of water and sanitation, including the 1979 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
16
 
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
17
 and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
18
 The Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) has indicated that access to sanitation is required to realise the rights to both 
an adequate standard of living and adequate housing.
19
 In other words, the right to adequate 
housing contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) envisages sustainable access to sanitation
20
  
It was only in 2010 that the United Nations General Assembly (GA) passed a 
resolution of its own, proclaiming ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as 
a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.’21 
Furthermore, a resolution passed by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) has since 
confirmed that the right to water and sanitation is legally binding in terms of international 
law.
22
 The motivation behind these resolutions is to place rights to water and sanitation 
amongst other international human rights where it is hoped that they will receive the 
necessary exposure to incentivise states to pass domestic legislation and policy to protect 
                                                          
13
 UNICEF & WHO, Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water – 2015 update and MDG assessment (2015) at 5. 
14
 Ibid at 44 & 50.  
15
 Ibid at 50.  
16
 Art. 14(2)(h). 
17
 Art. 24 para 2.  
18
 Art. 28 para 2(a).  
19
 De Albuquerque op cit note 8 at 26.  
20
 CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), 13 December 
1991, E/1992/23 para 8(b). 
21
 UN General Assembly, The human right to water and sanitation: resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly, 3 August 2010, A/RES/64/292. 
22
 UN Human Rights Council, The human right to safe drinking water and sanitation: resolution adopted by the 
Human Rights Council, 2 October 2014, A/HRC/RES/27/7. 
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them.
23
 As with all other human rights, it will also impose duties on state governments to 
respect, protect and fulfil these rights.
24
  
These three core responsibilities require at a minimum that state governments refrain 
from negatively infringing upon or otherwise preventing people from enjoying the access 
they already have to water and sanitation without providing an adequate alternative. 
However, rights to water and sanitation are also socio-economic rights and, like all economic, 
social and cultural rights, they are subject to the requirement of “progressive realisation”.25 
Specifically, this positive duty imposed in terms of the ICESCR requires that states take 
“deliberate, concrete, and targeted steps” toward realising their obligations in terms of the 
Covenant.
26
 In other words, although recognising the technical, economic and political 
constraints facing state parties, the Covenant requires that states do not sit idly by, but take 
incremental steps towards realising these rights within their “maximum available” 
resources.
27
  
South Africa, who remains a member state of the UN, voted in favour of the above-
mentioned GA resolution, committing itself to the position that such a right is deserving of 
being respected, protected and fulfilled.
28
 However, what should be of particular concern to 
South Africa is the finding by UNICEF and WHO that despite remarkable growth, sub-
Saharan Africa has maintained its status of having some of the poorest access to improved 
sanitation in the world.
29
  
South Africa in particular is considered to have made “moderate progress” toward 
reaching its Millennium Development Goals (MDG). This means that it failed to meet its 
commitment to halving the portion of its population who do not have sustainable access to 
basic sanitation.
30
 Access to basic sanitation is based on the MDG indicator of who has 
access to or use of an improved sanitation facility.
31
 Therefore, what the figures of UNICEF 
and WHO’s joint global assessment reveal is that while 51% of the country’s population had 
access to improved sanitation in 1990, it has only managed to increase this overall percentage 
                                                          
23
 De Albuquerque op cit note 8 at 22-23 & 29.  
24
 Ibid at 22.  
25
 Ibid at 23. 
26
 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. , Para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 
December 1990, E/1991/23 paras 2 & 9.  
27
 Ibid para 9; De Albuquerque op cit note 8 at 23.  
28
 Amnesty International,  Recognition of the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation by UN Member States at 
the International Level (2014) at 102.  
29
 UNICEF & WHO op cit note 13 at 7 & 12.  
30
 Ibid at 12. 
31
 Ibid at 51. 
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to 66% by 2015. The remainder of its population relies primarily on unimproved facilities 
including shared facilities (22%), other unimproved facilities (8%) or otherwise resorts to 
open defecation (4%).
32
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Ibid at 72. 
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Chapter 2: Access to Sanitation in South Africa 
2.1.WHAT IS ACCESS TO SANITATION?  
Before discussing how a right to sanitation could be enforced domestically, with all the 
nuances of South Africa’s legal and political realities, the following question remains: what 
exactly is sanitation and why is it important that people have “access” to it?  
“Sewage”, defined narrowly, often refers to a category of waste water contaminated 
with human faeces or urine but can also refer to waste water more generally.
33
 On the other 
hand, “sanitation” is primarily concerned with the infrastructure used to safely remove human 
waste or sewage including, but is not limited to, ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrines or 
waterborne flush toilets.
34
 In developing countries like South Africa, where there are large 
and concentrated peri-urban and urban populations, sanitation has both a private and public 
component, particularly in informal settlements which often rely on shared or communal 
facilities.
35
 
In contrast, the term ‘access’ speaks to a particular perspective on how sanitation 
should be conceived of. It is submitted that, like water, sanitation should be seen first as a 
right and not a mere commodity. What this means is that local government and private 
companies who have been enlisted to provide basic municipal services must understand that 
it is their duty to ensure that all households are provided with the acceptable minimum level 
of access to sanitation despite the availability of finances or whether people are able to afford 
it.
36
 An undertaking like this requires a significant capital investment but it is vital that poor 
people have access to the necessary infrastructure including water supply, sanitation and 
refuse removal systems.
37
 
Access to sanitation also refers to the ability of people to use and continue using the 
infrastructure or facilities provided to them. Firstly, anything or anyone that impedes this use 
would undoubtedly infringe on another’s ability to access these facilities. Secondly, to have 
continues access would most certainly include the ongoing services and maintenance required 
to keep these facilities running and in working order.
38
 If a person, company or the state were 
                                                          
33
 Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI), Basic Sanitation in South Africa: A Guide to 
Legislation, Policy and Practice (2011) at 10. 
34
 Ibid at 13.  
35
 Ibid at 13-14.  
36
 SAHRC op cit note 3 at 18.  
37
 Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), Guidelines for the Implementation of the National 
Indigent Policy by Municipalities Draft Document 1 (November 2005) at 15.  
38
 SAHRC op cit note 3 at 18.  
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to hamper another’s access this would not only run the risk of violating their rights, but 
would also affect the ability of people to lead a dignified existence.
39
 
A rights based approach to service delivery further requires that those who provide 
such services act in according with the principles of engagement and transparency.
40
 These 
principles envision effective and comprehensive public participation, that attention is given to 
especially vulnerable groups, that there is sufficient access to information and that grievance 
mechanisms are put in place to ensure accountability. Furthermore, the principle of non-
discrimination is particularly important as it is essential to ensure that there is universal 
access to services like sanitation and that access is not excluded on the basis of either race, 
class, gender, sexual orientation, disability or religion.
41
 
2.2. STATUS OF ACCESS TO SANITATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
At first glance South Africa’s overall status in respect to the provision of sanitation does not 
immediately portray a state of crisis. Statistics South Africa’s latest General Household 
Survey revealed that nationally the percentage of households with access to Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) standard toilet facilities has increased from 62,3% in 
2002 to approximately 79,9% in 2015.
42
 The Western Cape (93,3%) and Gauteng (91%) 
registered the highest in this respect with the Eastern Cape (81,7%) showing the most 
dramatic improvement, increasing access to sanitation in the region by 48,2%.
43
 Furthermore, 
the statistics reveal that sanitation service delivery to the country’s metropolitans, which 
hosts the country’s most concentrated urban populations, sits well above the overall national 
average at 89,9%, with the City of Tshwane (82%) and eThekwini (83,5%) registering the 
lowest in performance.
44
  
Once deconstructed however, these statistics portray a rather contrasting narrative. 
Other parts of the country have registered almost no growth over the last 7 years and, in some 
cases, have even depreciated. Only half of the population of Limpopo (53%) has access to 
RDP standard sanitation whereas Mpumalanga (65,8%) and the North West (66,4%) have 
approximately two-thirds access.
45
 Along with the Eastern Cape, these three provinces also 
                                                          
39
 Ibid at 7.  
40
 Ibid at 34.  
41
 Ibid.  
42
 Statistics South Africa, General Household Survey 2015 (Issued: 02 June 2016) at 49.  
43
 Ibid.  
44
 Ibid at 50.  
45
 Ibid at 49.  
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registered the worst figures, at approximately 7%, for households that have never had access 
to sanitation services at all.
46
  
Besides satisfaction surveys, there is little official government discussion of the 
quality of the sanitation service provided.
47
 RDP level services generally speak to the 
minimum required of government and are often far from desirable. The City of Cape Town, 
who often proclaims its sanitation service delivery to be the best in the country, is a case in 
point.
48
 Despite the City’s claims that its statistics are being misconstrued, there has been 
enough evidence presented by the Social Justice Coalition, GroundUp and Cornerstone 
Economic Research to suggest that not only are sanitation budget allocations to informal 
settlements completely inadequate
49
 but further, as the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC) reports, the quality of the sanitation service in places like Khayelitsha 
may in fact constitute human rights violations.
50
 The same may be true for the informal 
settlement of Masiphumelele near Cape Point.
51
 
There also appear to be concerning, yet substantiated allegations that the South 
African government is inflating its figures to portray a higher level of access to sanitation 
than is the reality.
52
 Reports across the country suggest that the norms and standards being 
applied by the national government are incorrect and that it often considers non-functioning, 
broken or defective infrastructure in support of its claims that it is providing ‘access’.53 In its 
findings on the status of sanitation in South Africa, the SAHRC sums up this situation as 
follows, noting that:  
Therefore, national statistics might indicate a higher level of access than is actually 
enjoyed in reality. If infrastructure for a service is provided, it seems to be considered 
by government that the right has been realised, despite the fact that there is no access 
                                                          
46
 Ibid at 50.  
47
 Ibid.  
48
 Masizole Mnqasela ‘Cape Town’s sanitation delivery the best in country’ GroundUp 25 May 2016, available 
at http://www.groundup.org.za, accessed on 30 August 2016.  
49
 Albert van Zyl & Jessica Taylor ‘Does the SJC understand Cape Town’s budget? You be the judge’ GroundUp 
24 May 2016, available at http://www.groundup.org.za , accessed 30 August 2016.  
50
 Daneel Knoetze ‘Human Rights Commission to probe city toilets again’ GroundUp 5 March 2015, available at 
http://www.groundup.org.za, accessed on 30 August 2016. 
51
 Thembela Ntongana ‘What it is like to live in Masiphumelele’ GroundUp 11 June 2015, available at 
http://www.groundup.org.za, accessed on 30 August 2016.  
52
 SAHRC op cit note 3 at 53.  
53
 Ibid at 53-54. 
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due to non-functional infrastructure and systems. In addition, evidence shows that 
some communities are still being charged for services that they do not receive.
54
 
The SAHRC has found that of equal concern is the state of water and waste water treatment 
plants across South Africa which are in a general state of disrepair and ill equipped to meet 
the needs of a growing population.
55
 It has been reported that not only does the quality of this 
vital service vary across the provinces, but that in some provinces it is almost non-existent. 
To illustrate this point, a representative of the National Taxpayers Union has previously 
indicated that there are as little as 33 functional sewerage works across the country and none 
of them are to be found in the Free State.
56
 
What these symptoms appear to illustrate is that, amongst other things, government 
lacks a sincere commitment to the provision of sanitation and an understanding of what a 
rights based approach to sanitation entails. Many who have reported to the SAHRC have 
cited that local government in particular is non-responsive, fails to engage with the 
community and fails to see the importance in generating awareness on peoples’ rights.57 The 
result is that government regularly reaches inappropriate decisions and fails to appreciate the 
effects that these decisions have on the vulnerable and marginalised.
58
 What is particularly 
concerning in the South African context is the high incidence of sexual violence inflicted on 
women and girls of all ages who fail to find safe access to sanitary facilities and who, often at 
night, seek out dangerously secluded fields and bushes to relieve themselves.
59
  
It is also no coincidence that a lack of access to sanitation to South Africa’s highly 
impoverished communities consists of black people who were historically disadvantaged 
under apartheid.
60
 However, over two decades later, using the spectre of apartheid alone as an 
excuse for a lack of access to sanitation loses increasing credibility as government fails to act 
outright on its service delivery mandates. Nevertheless, there are two particularly important 
and interrelated inferences to be drawn from the statistics and reports provided above. The 
first is that there is a direct correlation between urban development and the quality of 
sanitation service delivery within South Africa. The second, and a corollary of the first, is that 
it is the country’s peripheral rural and peri-urban populations, its poorest and most 
                                                          
54
 Ibid.  
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Ibid at 55. 
57
 Ibid at 60.  
58
 Ibid at 61. 
59
 Ibid at 61-62. 
60
 Ibid at 40.  
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vulnerable, who have little to no access to sanitation and who have largely been ignored by 
government. 
2.3. SANITATION RELATED LEGISLATION AND POLICY  
2.3.1. Who is responsible for the provision of sanitation? 
Initially, with South Africa’s transition into a constitutional democracy, the primary authority 
tasked with addressing the country’s woefully unequal distribution of sanitation services, a 
legacy of the apartheid regime, fell on the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF).
61
 It launched the National Sanitation Programme in 1996 which aspired to erasing 
South Africa’s sanitation backlog by 2010. Furthermore, in order to better coordinate the 
relevant governmental departments involved, the National Sanitation Task Team (NSTT) was 
formed with representatives not only from Department of Water Affairs (DWA) but also the 
Departments of Health, Education, Housing, Environmental Affairs, Public Works and the 
National Treasury.
62
 
Unfortunately, the NSTT was disbanded and further attempts to coordinate the 
relevant departments enjoyed relatively little success.
63
 This has been exasperated by the 
numerous departmental and cabinet reshuffles by the national executive in recent years.
64
 
With the election of President Jacob Zuma in 2009, the provision of sanitation was 
transferred to the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and, following the general 
election in 2014, was transferred back to the DWA. On this occasion it was renamed the 
Department of Water and Sanitation where it is hoped that the consolidation of sanitation 
delivery under a single national department will streamline executive decision making.
65
 
2.3.2. Constitutional Governance 
Although a variety of socio-economic rights are enshrined in the Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights, the right of access to sanitation is not amongst them. However, there are a number of 
provisions found elsewhere in the Constitution that could indirectly serve to protect such a 
right. Perhaps the most relevant of these provisions can be found under Part B of Schedule 4 
of the Constitution which provides that local government is primarily responsible for the 
delivery of water and sanitation services. Its powers and responsibilities in this respect are set 
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out further under Ch 7 of the Constitution where both s 152 and s 153 lay these out in further 
detail.  
The objects of local government are listed in section 152(1) which provides that local 
government must be democratic and accountable; deliver services to communities 
sustainably; promote social and economic development; promote a safe and healthy 
environment; and encourage community participation. Furthermore, the developmental duties 
of municipalities are provided in terms of section 153, which requires that they structure their 
administrative, budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of local 
communities and, like section 152, promote social and economic development.  
In other words, the Constitution envisions that it is local government that will 
administer on the ground access to sanitation. Bearing this in mind, the provisions contained 
in section 195 of the Constitution set out the basic values and principles governing public 
administration. Not only must the public administration promote the democratic values and 
principles contained in the Constitution it must, amongst other things, make efficient, 
economic and effective use of state resources; provide services equitably; encourage public 
participation; remain accountable and act transparently.
66
  
In order to understand whether these constitutional objectives are being given effect 
to, it is important to understand the relevant legislative and policy schemes designed to 
implement them. As already noted, the Constitution indicates that it is primarily a service 
delivery matter and, in this respect, South Africa has developed one of the most progressive 
legislative and policy frameworks for basic services in the world.
67
  
2.3.3. Local Government 
The Municipal Systems Act is designed to give effect to sections 152, 153 and 195 of the 
Constitution.
68
 The Preamble to Act requires that local government work progressively 
toward providing basic services to all people, particularly those that are poor or 
disadvantaged. To facilitate this requirement local government or municipalities are required 
to give priority to the basic needs of the local community and ensure that all its members 
have access to the ‘minimum level of municipal services’.69  
The Act defines ‘basic municipal services’ as those services that are necessary to 
‘ensure an acceptable and reasonable quality of life and, if not provided, would endanger 
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public health or safety or the environment.’70 However, the provision of these basic services 
to the poor must also be financially sustainable.
71
 Therefore, they are subject to municipal 
tariff policies which may include tariffs that cover operating or maintenance costs, special or 
life line tariffs, or any other method of subsidisation.
72
 
In terms of the Act the Minister may issue regulations for the ‘development and 
implementation of an indigent policy’.73 Two policies designed to facilitate this requirement 
were the Free Basic Services (FBS) programme and the Free Basic Water (FBW) 
Implementation Strategy, adopted in 2000 and 2001 respectively.
74
 In 2005 the South African 
Department of Local Government, which has since transitioned into the Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, issued Guidelines for the Implementation of 
the National Indigent Policy by Municipalities.
75
 
The guideline provides that ‘due to the level of unemployment and poverty within 
municipal areas, there are both households and citizens who are unable to access or pay for 
basic services; this grouping is referred to as the “indigent”’.76 The guideline defines 
‘indigent’ broadly as those persons ‘lacking the necessities of life’ which includes sufficient 
water, basic sanitation and environmental health.
77
 In light of the fact that the Constitution 
provides that all citizens have a right of access to the basic level of services, municipalities 
are required to ‘develop and adopt an indigent policy to ensure that the indigent can have 
access to the package of services included in the FBS programme’.78  
Because those classified as indigent cannot afford to pay, the guideline provides an 
outline of essential services and the free basic amount of each service that each person is 
entitled to. At the very minimum, an indigent person is entitled to a ‘Free Basic Water’ 
supply of 6 kilolitres per household per month and, in respect to sanitation, is entitled to 
access either a ventilated improved pit latrine or toilet connected to a septic tank or to water-
borne sewerage.
79
 However, it is worth noting that the guideline acknowledges that the 
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provision of FBS services alone will not see the standard of living for indigent communities 
improve without an integrated approach to delivering social services more broadly.
80
   
2.3.4. The Department of Water and Sanitation  
The DWS is the national custodian of water resources and is responsible for the formulation 
and implementation of legislation and policy pertaining to the water sector. Included within 
the scope of its jurisdiction is the provision of sanitation.
81
 More specifically, the DWS is 
required to establish national policy guidelines, national water and sanitation strategies, 
authorise waste discharge, develop enforcement mechanisms, set minimum standards and 
monitor the progress of sanitation service delivery.
82
 Furthermore, its national and provincial 
spheres are responsible for exercising oversight over local government in fulfilling these 
objectives.
83
 
The Water Services Act outlines the duties of the DWS and confirms the position that 
the South African government has indeed committed itself to the provision of sanitation from 
a rights based perspective.
84
 In short, the Act provides that water service institutions and 
authorities in local government are required to facilitate the ‘right of access to basic 
sanitation’ which they must take ‘reasonable measures’ to realise.85 However, read alone, it is 
not entirely clear what measures the Act envisions.  
The Act further falls short of defining the precise content of what could be considered 
access to basic sanitation. It defines ‘basic sanitation’ as the ‘prescribed minimum standard of 
services necessary for the safe, hygienic and adequate collection, removal, disposal or 
purification of human excreta, domestic waste-water and sewage from households, including 
informal households.’86 However, the Regulations Relating to Compulsory National 
Standards and Measures to Conserve Water serves as a guideline to interpreting the Act.
87
 It 
requires that the minimum standard for basic sanitation include the ‘provision of appropriate 
health and hygiene education’ as well as a toilet which is safe, reliable, environmentally 
sound, well ventilated and ensures privacy.
88
 
                                                          
80
 Ibid at 10.  
81
 SALRC op cit note 64 at 13.  
82
 National Sanitation Policy 2016 at 3.  
83
 Ibid.  
84
 Act 108 of 1997. 
85
 Section 3.  
86
 Section 1.  
87
 Reg. 2 of Government notice R509 of 8 June 2001. 
88
 Section 2.  
22 
 
Of course the general lack of content in terms of the Act may be a result of the fact 
that it is predominantly water related legislation. However, there has been a growing focus by 
the DWS and its predecessors on sanitation specific policy in recent times. The 2008 Free 
Basic Sanitation (FBSan) Implementation Strategy was developed to act as a guide to water 
service authorities in ‘providing all citizens with free basic sanitation by 2014”.89 Although 
the completion of this objective remains outstanding, the Preface to the FBSan Strategy 
acknowledges that a “right of access to a basic level of sanitation service is enshrined in the 
Constitution’ and reiterates that local government has an obligation to ensure that poor 
households are not denied access to basic services due to their inability to pay for them.
90
 
The FBSan Strategy defines basic sanitation much the same way as the Act but 
anticipates that the provision of sanitation must be flexible in the face of the inevitable 
financial challenges that face government. Notwithstanding these constraints, it provides that 
there is no excuse for people receiving less the minimum basic level of access to sanitation.
91
 
On a technical level this minimum closely resembles the Guidelines for the Implementation 
of the National Indigent Policy by Municipalities, namely, it requires anything from VIP 
latrines to waterborne flush toilets, funded through a variety of tariff or subsidy 
arrangements.
92
 
The DWS’s most recent report on the provision of sanitation is also the Department’s 
most comprehensive. Last year the DWS released its much anticipated National Sanitation 
Programme which reviewed the current legislative and policy framework as it relates to 
sanitation.
93
 Its Preamble notes that despite the gains of the White Paper on Water Supply and 
Sanitation (1994); the White Paper on a National Water Policy of South Africa (1997); the 
White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation (2001) and the Strategic Framework for Water 
Services (2003), there is ‘an absence of regulation at all levels of government’ concerning 
sanitation.
94
 
The policy acknowledges that a ‘right to sanitation’ is implicit in the fundamental 
rights to dignity and access to an environment that is not harmful to a person’s health or 
wellbeing.
95
 Furthermore, it affirms the constitutional responsibility that government must 
not only ensure that there is ‘universal access to basic sanitation’ but, like the Water Services 
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Act, requires that local government ‘must take reasonable measures to realise this right.’96 
However, a noteworthy feature of the policy is its attempt to clearly delineate the concepts of 
basic sanitation, basic sanitation facilities and basic sanitation services in giving effect to this 
access.
97
  
In contrast to previous legislation and policy, the policy broadens the acceptable 
minimum level of basic sanitation by placing increased emphasis on the environment and 
particular vulnerable groups of people.
98
 It notes that according to Statistics South Africa, 
there are only 1.7 million of 3 million recognised indigent households receiving FBSan 
services.
99
 However, where provided, free basic sanitation requires appropriate health and 
hygiene awareness; the ‘lowest cost’ system that is not only functional but is safe to children, 
hygienic, easily accessible and does not have a detrimental impact on the environment; 
houses a toilet with a hand washing facility; ensures a clean living environment both privately 
and communally; and considers the ‘defecation practices of small children and people with 
disabilities and special needs.’100  
On the other hand, basic sanitation facilities or infrastructure should consider the 
natural topography of the area, be reliable, provide privacy, have the capacity for local 
operation and maintenance, be well ventilated, maintain control of disease carrying pests, 
facilitate hand washing, and enable safe and appropriate treatment of human waste.
101
 Basic 
sanitation services refer to the maintenance of basic sanitation facilities to ensure that they are 
both environmentally and operationally sustainable. This includes the safe removal of human 
waste or wastewater and the local monitoring of good sanitation and hygiene practices.
102
 
A remarkable feature introduced by the policy is the loosely defined ‘polluter pays 
principle’. The rationale behind the principle flows from the understanding that, first and 
foremost, ‘sanitation has economic value’.103 The principle’s purpose is not only to penalise 
those who pollute but to raise revenue for the provision of water and sanitation.
104
 However, 
the policy provides little guidance on how exactly such a process would be regulated or who 
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falls within its scope. Instead, it directs the Minister to issue regulations that will develop and 
enforce the polluter pays principle.
105
  
In terms of South Africa’s international obligations, the policy acknowledges that 
national standards for sanitation will be developed in such a way that corresponds with the 
international human right to sanitation.
106
 It is envisioned that these national standards will 
reflect international guidelines like those provided by WHO, taking into consideration 
circumstances unique to South Africa. Furthermore, the objectives of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) will be pursued, including achieving access to adequate and 
equitable sanitation, substantially increasing water efficiency and strengthening community 
participation.
107
 
2.3.5. The Housing Act  
Given the polycentric nature of service delivery, it is not only the DWS that plays a pivotal 
role in ensuring that South Africans have access to sanitation. The Department of Human 
Settlements (DHS) remains the primary authority for the development of South Africa’s 
housing and, therefore, is responsible for much of the infrastructural needs of communities. 
Therefore, a conversation about sanitation infrastructure is a conversation that cannot be had 
without reference to the Housing Act
108
 which was partly inspired by the 1994 White Paper 
on Water Supply and Sanitation Policy and which is now South Africa’s principal housing 
legislation.
109
  
Its Preamble states that the Act was promulgated to give effect to ‘the right to have 
access to adequate housing’ enshrined in s 26 of the Constitution. In terms of s 26(2) the state 
was required to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.’ 
The Act explicitly provides for a right of ‘access’ to ‘potable water, adequate sanitary 
services and domestic energy supply.’110 Like the Constitution, the Act acknowledges that the 
provision of adequate housing is a service delivery matter. It requires municipalities to ‘take 
all reasonable and necessary steps’ through the applicable housing legislation and policy to 
realise the right of access to adequate housing. Furthermore, municipalities are required to 
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ensure that the provision of services, including water, sanitation and electricity, are provided 
in an economically efficient manner.
111
  
Since its proclamation, the Housing Act has been supported further by a 
comprehensive policy framework. The 2009 National Housing Code sought to introduced 
technical specifications as to what constitutes a right of access to adequate housing.
112
 It 
provides that in order to facilitate this right South Africans will have access, ‘on a progressive 
basis’, to potable water and adequate sanitary facilities.113 
The 1999 National Norms and Standards for the Construction of Stand Alone 
Residential Dwellings, later revised in terms of the National Norms and Standards in respect 
of Permanent Residential Structures and which has since been included in the 2009 National 
Housing Code (the "Code"), Generally speaking, the Code provides that all residential 
properties developed through national housing programmes are required to meet, at the very 
least, a minimum level of service. In respect to sanitation this must include communal VIP 
latrines or an alternative system agreed to with a particular community.
114
 
Where sanitary infrastructure is built directly into a single house the Norms and 
Standards in Respect of Stand Alone Residential Structures (Houses) provide a number of 
improved specifications that each house is required, at a minimum, to meet. In other words, 
the standard is higher than would normally be expected of basic services. In respect to 
providing access to sanitation, this standard includes ‘[a] separate bathroom with a toilet and 
kitchen with a basin’ that must have a ‘[m]aximum 10 meter connected to municipal water 
supply and sewer.’115 Where it is determined that a house requires non-waterborne means of 
sanitation the Norms and Standards require that a municipality meet the technical 
requirements of section 7.4 of SABS 0252-2: Water supply and drainage of buildings; Part 
2: Drainage Installations for buildings.
116
 
The Code has been amended further to provide local government with direction in 
particular or exceptional circumstances where the quality of service delivery may also vary 
from the basic standard. The Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme (UISP) is 
designed to provide funding to municipalities who wish to upgrade informal communities in 
situ. If the request to upgrade the settlement is approved by the MEC for Human Settlements, 
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the Code requires that access to certain interim services, including access to interim 
sanitation, be provided as part of the first phase of delivering permanent or improved 
services.
117
  
Interim services include the provision of ‘basic water and sanitation services... on an 
interim basis pending the formalisation of the settlement.’118 These services are not expected 
to adhere to the National Norms and Standards at this stage of the project.
119
 However, after 
engaging with the community to ascertain their needs, the provision of permanent sanitary 
facilities must be of a higher standard of craftsmanship and should adhere to the National 
Norms and Standards.
120
  
A further policy contained in the Code is the Emergency Housing Programme (EHP) 
which is designed to act as a guide in providing temporary housing in situations of 
emergency. The EHP requires the provision of interim services in an emergency situation, 
including the provision of interim sanitation.
121
 Similar to the interim services of the UISP, 
the EHP is not subject to the National Norms and Standards but rather subject to its own. In 
respect of interim sanitation, the policy provides that at least one ventilated improved pit 
latrine must be provided per every five households.
122
  
Whether the provision of EHP interim sanitation would be held to the minimum 
standard expected of basic services is still open for debate. However, EHP guidelines 
published by the Housing Development Agency (HDA) suggest that ‘interim basic municipal 
services’ may include the provision of basic sanitation and, although not prescriptive, the 
provision of toilets connected to water borne sewerage in circumstances where authorities 
decide the minimum to be insufficient.
123
 
Recently, the Department of Human Settlements has re-emphasised the integral role 
that basic sanitation has in realising the right of access to adequate housing in future housing 
developments.
124
 Not only must all new human settlements be fitted with the requisite 
infrastructure and services that would provide access to basic sanitation, the DHS’s latest 
White Paper has indicated that the same is expected for existing settlements who must be 
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provided with ‘basic universal services such as water and sanitation.’125 In short, the message 
promoted by the DHS is that government must work collaboratively to ensure that 
households ‘have access to roads, street lighting, sanitation and water drainage systems.’126 
2.3.6. Concluding remarks 
Outlined above is South Africa’s current legislative and policy framework as it applies to 
sanitation. However, it appears that a distinction can be drawn between providing access to 
basic sanitation as opposed to interim, adequate or improved sanitation. Clearly these are not 
all precisely the same things but they do share a significant overlap. Furthermore, 
collectively, they all form part of a basket of entitlements that facilitate a far wider right of 
access to sanitation.  
We know in light of recent policy that realising a right to basic sanitation refers to a 
minimum threshold requirement and largely focuses on the needs of the poor. Broadly 
speaking, the state is required to take reasonable measures to realise this right. In other words, 
the provision of sanitation will be considered reasonable where access to a toilet is given 
which, despite being the lowest cost system, takes into consideration the topography of its 
environment and is considered safe, private, hygienic, well ventilated, reliable, easily 
accessible and capable of disposing human waste. Furthermore, the design of such a facility 
must also take into account the use of certain vulnerable groups, including small children and 
those with special needs or disabilities. 
The provision of basic sanitation must also be shown to be environmentally, 
financially and operationally sustainable. Where a sanitary facility risks the life, health or 
safety of a community or otherwise threatens harm to the environment, it may be considered 
unreasonable. Furthermore, it may infringe on certain fundamental rights, particularly the 
rights to dignity and a healthy environment.  
Examples of basic sanitary facilities include, amongst other things, either a VIP pit 
latrine or toilet connected to a septic tank or water borne sewerage. Furthermore, where an 
agreement is reached, local government may provide sanitary facilities that are unique to a 
particular community. However, it is suggested that those facilities would still have to meet 
the minimum reasonableness threshold applied to standard facilities. In any event, regardless 
of the facility provided, it must also ensure access to a wash facility.  
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In contrast, the provision of interim sanitation is context specific. In terms of the 
UISP, interim sanitation must, at the very least, reach the minimum threshold expected of 
basic sanitation. However, as time passes, it is unlikely that the provision basic sanitation 
alone would be sufficient. Interim sanitation, by its very nature, is considered to be a 
temporary measure. Once upgraded, a formal settlement is expected have access to a level of 
service that is not only permanent but adheres to the National Norms and Standards of Stand 
Alone Residential Structures.  
 In terms of the Code’s EHP it seems that recipients of emergency services may 
expect the provision of basic services including basic sanitation. Similar to the UISP, the 
provision of such services should be considered a temporary measure in times of emergency. 
However, because the cause of an emergency may be unforeseeable and its effects 
unpredictable, it is arguable that what considered environmentally, financially and 
operationally sustainable may vary from the basic standard. For Example, the EHP’s explicit 
reference to a ratio of one VIP pit latrine for every five households suggests that access to 
these interim facilities may be comparatively limited.  
It is noteworthy that South Africa’s legislation and policy does not explicitly provide 
for a right of access to ‘adequate sanitation’. Nevertheless, there do appear to be a handful of 
examples where reference is made to acquiring access to adequate sanitary services. Policy 
maker’s reluctance to provide for a specific ‘right’ of access to adequate sanitation could be a 
result of their reluctance to elevate a right of access to sanitation to an entitlement resembling 
a fundamental right. However, following the from the fact that the country’s Housing Act is 
meant to facilitate the right of access to adequate housing, it is conceivable that the Code’s 
National Norms and Standard’s provisions on sanitation could amount to a standard 
considered ‘adequate’.  
Very little reference is made to ‘improved’ sanitation let alone explicit reference to it 
as a standalone right. However, in terms of the UISP especially, it appears to be used 
interchangeably with its reference to permanent services, services which should adhere to the 
Code’s National Norms and Standards. Therefore, although not conclusive, this could refer to 
a similar, if not the same, standard expected of adequate sanitary services.  
In the international sense the reference to improved sanitation appears to refer to a 
standard somewhat similar to South Africa’s definition of basic sanitation. As was previously 
mentioned, international authorities like WHO and Unicef refer to ‘improved’ services as 
including a variety of broadly defined latrines and toilets. So called ‘unimproved sanitation 
29 
 
facilities’ which fall short of acceptable standards include pit latrines without a slab, hanging 
latrines, bucket latrines or ‘shared facilities’.127  
It is suggested that an exclusion of shared facilities should either be revised or treated 
with some circumspection in respect to its application to developing countries like South 
Africa. The reason for this is that realising a right of access to sanitation is a nuanced 
undertaking and, although far from ideal, shared facilities do not necessarily violate a 
person’s access to sanitation.128 Where facilities are well maintained, safe and hygienic they 
should be considered acceptable, particularly in the short term.
129
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Chapter 3: Litigating Socio-Economic Rights  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The legislative and policy framework regulating sanitation as discussed above demonstrates 
that a right of access to sanitation does in fact exist in South Africa. This right manifests itself 
in a variety of forms, be it access to basic, interim, adequate or improved sanitation. All are 
concerned with service delivery. However, it is possible that there are other forms of 
sanitation related rights, including the potential for a so called ‘public law right’ to sanitation. 
The profile for such a right was laid down in the Constitutional Court decision of Joseph v 
City of Johannesburg where litigants were successfully able to show that their ‘public law 
right to electricity’ was infringed upon.130  
The decision of Joseph falls amongst a larger and more nuanced body of 
jurisprudence where socio-economic rights and administrative law intersect. It not only 
provides the basis for so called public law rights, but illustrates the importance of relying on 
rights and entitlements flowing from legislation and policy to protect access to services. 
However, before elaborating on the intricacies of this apparent union between two disparate 
bodies of law it is appropriate to answer a number of preliminary questions.  
The first question asks why take a litigious approach to enforcing a right of access to 
sanitation and what makes this approach advantageous? The second introduces the 
fundamentals of South Africa’s constitutional and administrative law before a brief yet 
necessary discussion is had on the principle of legality and whether it may have some use to 
enforcing a right of access to sanitation. The third explores why justiciable socio-economic 
rights are controversial and what considerations courts must take into account when 
pronouncing on them.  
3.1.1. The rationale behind formal adjudication  
Although there are a variety of ways to enforce access rights, the perspective adopted by this 
paper is a litigious one. This is generally considered an unpopular choice because most 
countries, particularly those in the developing world, consider litigation to be costly, time 
consuming and therefore inaccessible to those who are most vulnerable.
131
 However, it is 
submitted that, given South Africa's reality of a public administration widely marred by 
mismanagement and a general lack of political will, many are left with no alternative but to 
resort to litigation.   
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From this perspective litigation can be used as an effective mechanism to enforce 
rights, hold government to account, and ensure that communities have appropriate 
remedies.
132
 Furthermore, litigation offers more than just an opportunity for immediate 
redress and presents the potential for greater legal certainty in future sanitation claims.
133
 The 
importance of this legal certainty extends to both the private and public spheres, compelling 
states to think critically on how best to draft legislation and policy to address the needs of not 
only private individuals, but the community at large.
134
  
Litigation provides an effective tool for advocacy too. It can serve as the fulcrum 
around which social mobilisation is organised and provide a powerful platform from which to 
exert further pressure on policy makers.
135
 There are a series of examples contained in this 
Chapter which illustrate that merely bringing a case before the courtroom persuaded the 
South African government to amend its policies before the outcome of the case had even 
been decided.  
Finally, in a country where corruption has become so endemic, the importance of an 
enforceable right to basic services cannot be gainsaid.
136
 While the scourge of corruption 
remains rife, it will be impossible to fully realise any of the fundamental human rights 
contained in the Constitution, let alone a right of access to sanitation. South Africa’s 
legislation and policy in respect to service delivery seemingly recognises this threat, which is 
why they, alongside the Constitution, enshrine the concomitant principles of transparency, 
participation and accountability.
137
  
3.1.2. The principles of subsidiarity, avoidance and legality 
Before the advent of democracy South Africa was an apartheid state which promulgated 
racially repressive legislation with effects that span to this day.
138
 During this period South 
Africa was characterised by its oppressive use of administrative power and executive 
autocracy.  Parliamentary sovereignty meant that outside of a limited number of procedural 
grounds, there was no way to review legislation on a substantive basis. Moreover, it was not 
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possible to approach a court and challenge the laws of the apartheid state by alleging that they 
constituted human rights violations.
139
 
Following the advent of our constitutional democracy, the Constitution, rather than 
Parliament, is supreme.
140
 Inherent in this development is the principle of constitutionalism 
which seeks to structure and constrain the exercise of public power.
141
 Therefore, while the 
state is empowered to govern, it can only do so where it acts consistently with the prescripts 
of the law. In other words, the principle of constitutionalism seeks to ensure that although a 
government may be limited, it cannot exercise arbitrary rule.
142
 
Alongside the principles of constitutionalism, democracy and the separation of 
powers, the Constitution is underpinned by the rule of law sourced in section 1 of the 
Constitution.
143
 Although the doctrine has a long standing history, in South Africa today the 
rule of law as a standard of judicial review is largely captured in terms of the ‘principle of 
legality’. This principle prescribes that all law and state conduct must be ‘rationally related to 
a legitimate government purpose’.144 This requirement has been most aptly encapsulated by 
the Constitutional Court in the decision of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: 
In re Ex Parte President of the RSA where it was held that:
145
 
[I]t is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the 
executive and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally 
related to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect 
arbitrary and inconsistent with this requirement. It follows that in order to pass 
constitutional scrutiny the exercise of public power by the executive and other 
functionaries must, at least, comply with this requirement. If it does not, it falls short 
of the standards demanded by our Constitution for such action.
146
  
Importantly, the Constitutional Court only looked to the principle of legality as a standard of 
review after declaring that the administrative justice provisions contained in section 33 of the 
Constitution, which provides that everyone is entitled to 'administrative action that is lawful, 
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reasonable and procedurally fair', were not applicable. This was because the Court found that 
the President’s conduct did not constitute administrative action.147  
What the court's reasoning illustrates is the principle of subsidiarity in motion. This, 
according to Currie & De Waal, is because ‘[a] norm of such generality and abstraction as the 
rule of law should not be directly applied until norms of greater specificity have been 
exhausted.’148 The norm of greater specificity in this case and at this time would have been 
the right to administrative justice contained in section 33 if the President’s conduct had 
indeed amounted to administrative action.  
Administrative law has evolved somewhat since the decision in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers. In terms of section 33(3) of the Constitution the state was required to enact 
national legislation that would comprehensively give effect to the rights enshrined within it. 
This took the form of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).
149
 In this context, 
linked to the principle of subsidiarity is the principle of avoidance which prescribes that 
litigants should seek out remedies sourced in legislation before they rely directly on 
constitutional remedies themselves.
150
 
In terms of both the principles of subsidiarity and avoidance it should ordinarily be 
the case that litigants rely on the rights contained in the PAJA first before they rely directly 
on those contained in section 33. The PAJA contains ‘norms of greater specificity’ and 
legislative remedies designed to give effect to the constitutional right. The fundamental right 
to administrative justice should apply in exceptional circumstances only, namely, when 
challenging the validity of the PAJA’s provisions, to challenge other parliamentary 
legislation suspected of infringing the right to administrative justice, and when interpreting 
the provisions of either the PAJA or other legislation.
151
  
Unfortunately, the vision that the PAJA would comprehensively regulate and 
integrate South Africa’s administrative law failed to materialise in full. Cora Hoexter 
describes the PAJA as an opportunity lost and, like the Court in Grey’s Marine v Minister of 
Public Works,
152
 has criticised the PAJA for its unmanageable definition of ‘administrative 
action’.153 This is because in order to challenge the exercise of public power in terms of the 
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PAJA it must first meet the requirements of this definition. However, this definition of 
administrative action is subject to a ‘palisade of qualifications’ so cumbersome that the Court 
in Grey’s Marine opted instead to use the pre-PAJA definition assigned to section 33 by the 
Constitutional Court in President of the RSA v SARFU.
154
 
The result, in part, is that alongside cases concerning administrative action and the 
application of PAJA there has been a burgeoning of legality review.
155
 This flows from the 
fact that all exercises of public power including administrative action must still be consistent 
with the principle of legality.
156
 As a result of its relative simplicity and flexibility the 
principle has since proved to be a popular alternative standard for judicial review and has 
incrementally expanded into areas that were thought to be unique to challenges of 
administrative action, including lawfulness, rationality and procedural fairness.
157
  
These developments have meant that legality review has taken on a form that is 
similar to both the PAJA and section 33 in content.
158
 In the case of Albutt v Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation the Constitutional Court relied on legality review 
intentionally because using the PAJA directly would raise ‘difficult questions’.159 Although 
this approach has its advantages it should be noted that it does undermine both the principle 
of subsidiarity and avoidance by choosing to rely on a more general and abstract 
constitutional provision over the provisions of the PAJA.
160
  
What has been said in relation to the principles of subsidiarity, avoidance and legality 
is important for two reasons. Firstly, the principles of subsidiarity and avoidance apply to 
socio-economic rights in the same way that they apply to administrative law. Litigants must 
frame their cause of action with reference to the entitlements that flow from the legislative 
and policy framework that was outlined in the previous chapter. This view appears to be 
supported by the language of the socio-economic rights included in the Constitution which 
requires that the state ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights.’161 
Secondly, it should be noted that the cases to be discussed below will almost 
invariably consider challenges to the exercise of public power. After all, it is the government 
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that is responsible for the provision of basic services like housing, electricity, water and 
sanitation. There will be cases where the PAJA is considered and cases where it is not. 
However, none of these cases, including those relating to sanitation, contemplate a successful 
challenge using the principle of legality.  
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness a discussion of the principle of legality is 
necessary. In many of these cases it would appear that the applicants involved did not even 
consider an application of legality review when it would have been applicable. This is not to 
say that it would have had any material bearing on the outcomes of these cases or that using 
legality review was even necessary. However, it should always be borne in mind that the 
principle of legality provides a flexible yet effective standard of review in difficult cases, 
particularly where the exercise of a public power does not constitute administrative action.  
3.1.3. Justiciability of socio-economic rights  
Although it is suggested that litigants should rely directly on sanitation related legislation and 
policy to enforce their right of access to sanitation this does not mean that fundamental rights 
should be discarded. Like the right to administrative justice it is submitted that socio-
economic rights perform the same interpretive and review functions in respect to the 
legislation and policy designed to give effect to them. In this respect, there are two socio-
economic provisions contained in the Bill of Rights that are of particular importance when 
outlining a right of access to sanitation. The first provision is the right of access to adequate 
housing enshrined in terms of section 26 and the second contains the rights of access to health 
care, food, water and social security enshrined in terms of section 27.  
It should not be forgotten that the inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution is part of its transformative ambition to ensure that all people are capable of 
enjoying a life of dignity, freedom and equality.
162
 The justiciability of these rights like all 
human rights places negative duties on other parties not to interfere with them and positive 
duties on the state to realise them.
163
 However, it is also the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights that gives rise to certain institutional concerns and difficulties for the courts.
164
  
Many commentators and state officials claim that the judiciary is not well suited to 
enforcing socio-economic rights. The first of these concerns is the suggestion that a judicial 
proclamation on the enforcement of socio-economic rights infringes on the separation of 
                                                          
162
 Currie & De Waal op cit note 138 at 564.  
163
 Ibid.  
164
 Ibid at 565.  
36 
 
powers principle because it is the executive that is responsible for service delivery.
165
 Where 
a court orders the state to redistribute resources in a way that is different to what was 
intended, it is the executive, and not the judiciary, that is the democratically elected branch of 
government and therefore accountable to ordinary South Africans for how these resources are 
delivered.
166
 
Secondly, a concern that causes the judiciary further institutional anxiety is the 
polycentric effects of their orders in socio-economic rights cases.  Many suggest that the 
judiciary is neither equipped with the personnel nor the resources to fully comprehend the 
budgetary or infrastructural considerations that sometimes affect the decisions of entire state 
departments.
167
 Not only would a court have to take into account this ‘complex web of 
mutually interacting resource allocations’, but it would also have to consider the 
consequences of its decision on the state and society at large.
168
  
Although these factors may explain the Constitutional Court’s cautious and 
deferential approach in many of its socio-economic rights cases of late, they do not reflect on 
the fact that these rights remain justiciable.
169
 As the Court explained in its First Certification 
judgment:
170
  
Nevertheless, we are of the view that these rights are, at least to some extent, 
justiciable. As we have stated in the previous paragraph, many of the civil and 
political rights entrenched in the New Constitution will give rise to similar budgetary 
implications without compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio-economic 
rights will almost inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a 
bar to their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be 
negatively protected from improper invasion. In light of these considerations, it is our 
view that the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the New Constitution does not 
result in a breach of the... [separation of powers].
171
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3.2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: THE FIRST WAVE 
Socio-economic rights have a dual character. Firstly, as was mentioned above, they are 
capable of being negatively protected, preventing the state and private persons from 
interfering with the existing rights of others. Secondly, sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the 
Constitution require the state to take positive measures toward realising these rights by 
requiring that it take ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’ to achieve the ‘progressive 
realisation’ of these rights.  
To date there are 23 Constitutional Court cases concerning fundamental socio-
economic rights, 15 of them relating to the right of access to adequate housing alone.
172
 
Looking at this jurisprudence in its entirety, Stuart Wilson and Jackie Dugard suggest that it 
can be divided into two distinct periods or ‘waves’.173 They suggest that the more traditional 
‘first wave’ ranges between 1998 and 2005. This period is characterised by the South African 
political context of the period and by the fact that justiciable socio-economic rights were still 
a relatively novel phenomenon at the time.  The Constitutional Court had to inspire 
confidence in its institutional integrity while also ensuring that the newly elected ANC 
government maintained its commitment to socio-economic transformation and basic service 
delivery.
174
 
One of the first of the Constitutional Court’s judgements is also one of its most 
important, illustrating how both the negative and positive facets of a right can be employed. 
In the case of Government of the RSA v Grootboom, a group of people who lived in 
deplorable conditions decided to illegally occupy private land that was earmarked for low 
cost housing.
175
 After refusing to leave the property a magistrate granted an eviction order 
against the occupiers. However, not only was the eviction carried out a day early, it was 
carried out using destructive methods that were reminiscent of the country’s apartheid past.176 
Rendered homeless, the occupiers applied for an order that the state provide them with 
temporary basic shelter until they received permanent accommodation in terms of the right of 
access to adequate housing.
177
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The Court noted that the question before it was not whether socio-economic rights 
were justiciable, but rather, to what extent these rights are enforceable in the particular 
circumstances.
178
 It held that in light of the facts of the case the state had, at the very least, 
violated the negative obligations imposed on it in terms of s 26(1).
179
 However, the Court 
acknowledged that this was not enough and that the Constitution harboured a vision for a 
society where adequate housing is made accessible to all South Africans.
180
 
With the positive obligations contained in s 26(2) in mind, the most important of the 
Court’s pronouncements was its adoption of the flexible “reasonableness test” which it used 
to investigate the reasonableness of the state’s housing policy.181 Firstly, in defining the 
notion of ‘access’ to housing, the Court held: 
The State’s obligation to provide access to adequate housing depends on the context, 
and may differ from province to province, from city to city, from rural to urban areas 
and from person to person. Some may need access to land and no more; some may 
need access to land and building materials; some may need access to finance; some 
may need access to services such as water, sewage, electricity and roads.
182
 
To facilitate access to housing the Constitution places positive obligations on the state to take 
legislative and other measures to progressively realise this right. Before underscoring how 
reasonableness extends both to the formulation of legislation and its implementation, the 
Court elaborated on the test’s parameters:  
The precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily a matter 
for the legislature and the executive. They must, however, ensure that the measures 
they adopt are reasonable ... A court considering reasonableness will not enquire 
whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or 
whether public money could have been better spent. The question would be whether 
the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a 
wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations. 
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Many of these would meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that 
the measures do so, this requirement is met.
183
 
This passage shows that while the state enjoys a significant discretion in designing the 
legislative measures used to realise the right of access to adequate housing these measures 
may nevertheless fall prey to the scrutiny of the courts.
184
 In this sense the standard of 
reasonableness is a pragmatic one and it allows the courts to manage their relationship with 
the political branches of government.
185
 However, the adoption of reasonable legislation 
alone will not be sufficient to meet this standard. The formulation of legislation is merely the 
first step in meeting the duties imposed in terms of section 26(2) because ‘[a]n otherwise 
reasonable programme that is not implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance 
with the state’s obligations.’186 In other words, both the programme itself and the state's 
implementation of it must be reasonable. 
Furthermore, wary of the pitfalls of an overly formalistic response from state parties 
and the need for universal access to housing, the Court warned that it would not be enough to 
satisfy a reasonableness test for the state ‘to show that the measures are capable of achieving 
a statistical advance in the realisation of the right ... if the measures, though statistically 
successful, fail to respond to the needs of the most desperate...’187 Ultimately, the Court 
found that the state had fallen short of these requirements and had therefore violated the 
housing rights of Grootboom and others.
188
 
Notably, in passing its judgement the Court considered the submissions of the amici 
who suggested that the right to adequate housing, and by extension other similarly drafted 
socio-economic rights, entailed a minimum core in terms of the ICESCR.
189
 They cited para 
10 of General Comment 3 of the CESCR which provides that state parties are required to 
show that every effort has been made, using all available resources, to satisfy a minimum 
core in respect to the right of access to adequate housing.
190
 The Court was unconvinced, 
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finding that the duty on the state to progressively realise the right to adequate housing did not 
place obligations on it to immediately realise the right as the CESCR would suggest.
191
 
The judgement of Grootboom remains one of the most far reaching of the Court’s 
socio-economic rights cases which set the tone for its future decisions.
192
 However, 
commentators suggest that the difficulty with the Court’s approach is its failure to define 
what exactly is expected of a reasonable housing policy.
193
 This may be true, but it is also in 
the decision’s flexibility that it finds its greatest strength.  
What the quotes above illustrate is that the Court’s reasonableness test is a variable 
enquiry and the entitlements available to litigants may be context specific. Importantly, the 
Court’s decision indicates that access to basic services, including sewage, forms part of the 
right of access to adequate housing. Therefore, it is conceivable that, for argument sake, 
where a housing policy provides for all the basic amenities required of it but for sewage or 
sanitation, it is unlikely that adoption of such a policy or its implementation would meet the 
constitutional reasonableness standard of s 26.  
The decision of Grootboom was one of a series of socio-economic cases decided by 
the Court during this first wave period. Other decisions included Soobramoney v Minister of 
Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal),
194
 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC),
195
 
Khosa v Minister of Social Development
196
 and Jaftha v Schoeman.
197
 In the TAC decision 
the Court used the reasonableness test in the context of access to healthcare where it was 
successfully employed by the respondents in terms of section 27(2) to challenge 
government’s policy to provide nevirapine, a drug that materially reduced the risk of mother 
to child transmission of HIV at birth, to a limited number of research and training clinics.
198
 
Furthermore, the Court reiterated the sentiment expressed in Grootboom on minimum core 
obligations, reiterating that the constitutional standard was one of reasonableness.
199
 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers the Court would ultimately set in 
motion substantive changes to how the state would have to facilitate community participation 
in implementing its policies.
200
 Community participation requirements are a hallmark feature 
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of South Africa’s basic service delivery policies including those that regulate the provision of 
sanitation. In this case the Court found in favour of the respondent occupiers who had been 
evicted and re-settled without receiving security of tenure in respect to their new homes.
201
 
However, it was Sachs J writing on behalf of the Court who hinted at the possibility of an 
engagement order in future eviction litigation:  
[T]he procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity cannot always be 
separated. The managerial roles of the courts may need to find expression in 
innovative ways. Thus, one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving 
sustainable reconciliation of the different interests involved is to encourage and 
require the parties to engage with each other in a pro-active and honest endeavour to 
find mutually acceptable solutions. Wherever possible, respectful face-to-face 
engagement or mediation through a third party should replace arms-length combat by 
intransigent opponents.
202
 
Unfortunately, the Court was of the opinion that it was too late to hand down an engagement 
order in the circumstances.
203
 However, this excerpt appeared to caution future litigants to 
engage with one another before resorting to litigation. Not only could this be characterised as 
a procedural duty on parties, but also a remedy where the Court finds that there was a lack of 
a sincere attempt to engage respectfully in ‘face to face’ mediation.204 
It is notable that this procedural requirement in Port Elizabeth Municipality bears a 
striking resemblance to the procedural fairness doctrine found under administrative law.
205
 
However, Wilson & Dugard suggest that while the Court’s first wave jurisprudence 
seemingly referred to administrative law principles like that of rationality, reasonableness and 
procedural fairness to evaluate the state’s compliance with its positive obligations, it cannot 
be said that the development of its ‘reasonableness test’ was a mere adaptation of 
administrative law norms.
206
 That being said, both doctrines ask, in one way or another, 
whether the means adopted by the state can reasonably achieve a legitimate legislative or 
constitutional purpose.
207
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What made the application of the reasonableness test particularly difficult during this 
period was that the comprehensive legislative and policy framework in respect to basic 
service delivery, like that outlined in Chapter 2, was still in the development process. This is 
unlike those cases considering the exercise of administrative action where the nature of the 
power and the interests to be taken into account would often be outlined in relative detail.
208
 
Because this was not the case in attempts to protect and realise socio-economic rights, it 
incentivised the courts to adopt a flexible and substantive interpretive approach to the 
fundamental rights involved.
209
 
3.3. THE ‘PROCEDURALISATION’ OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: THE SECOND 
WAVE 
3.3.1. Introduction 
In contrast, the Court’s second wave period is characterised by an increased reliance on the 
procedural aspects of socio-economic rights, rather than a deepening of the contextual 
reasonableness test adopted in Grootboom.
210
 Furthermore, it is an approach that has been 
typified by the Court’s direction to government that it implement pre-existing policy and 
respect the municipal duties it owes to claimants in a particular case.
211
  
The case said to mark the beginning of this second wave trend was that of Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg where the Court elaborated on the duty of 
engagement introduced by Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality.
212
 The applicants in Olivia 
Road were occupiers of inner city buildings located in Johannesburg and were evicted after 
the City’s authorities determined their buildings unsafe and unhealthy.213 However, not only 
had the city authorities refused to provide alternative accommodation to the occupiers, they 
failed to ascertain either their identities or housing needs and failed to seek representations or 
consider the consequences of an eviction.
214
 
The case led to the Court issuing its first ever engagement order.
215
 The Court held 
that ‘meaningful engagement’ is a component part of reasonableness and a procedural 
requirement of section 26(2) of the Constitution.
216
 However, despite finding that the 
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occupier’s were entitled to a hearing, little other mention was made to norms of an 
administrative law nature.
217
 Nevertheless, the Court warned that this procedural requirement 
was not isolated to this case and that it would be expected of organs of state that they engage 
“individually and collectively” with persons who may be rendered homeless before resorting 
to an eviction in future.
218
  
The decision of Olivia Road is cited as a particularly clear example of the increasing 
‘proceduralisation’ of socio-economic rights that would typify the Court’s second wave 
jurisprudence.
219
 The decision was considered unique for focusing on the procedural fairness 
of the state's decision to evict.
220
 More specifically, it appears that the Court’s engagement 
order could be characterised as a strong form of the classic administrative law principle of 
audi alterem partem, namely, the duty to allow an affected party a fair hearing before taking 
a decision that would affect them.
221
 However, the decision has been criticised for bypassing 
the opportunity to further develop the substantive norms surrounding section 26 itself.
222
 
The Court’s finding in Olivia Road would set a strong precedent for future litigation. 
A similar issue arose in the case of Residents of the Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes concerning the City of Cape Town’s N2 Gateway project. The N2 
Gateway Project was a policy arrangement developed in terms of the broader Breaking New 
Ground (BNG) policy and it was designed to provide formal housing for low income families 
on the site known as the Joe Slovo informal settlement.
223
 However, occupiers who lived in 
Joe Slovo refused to make way for the implementation of the City’s policy on the basis that 
they were not guaranteed permanent housing upon their return.
224
 In short, the question 
before the Court was not just whether the decision to evict was just and equitable, but 
whether the N2 Gateway project effectively realised the right of access to adequate 
housing.
225
 
The applicants claimed that the City’s conduct gave rise to the legitimate expectation 
that 70% of the houses built in terms of its policy would be assigned to them. This was 
evidenced through certain “red cards” that were issued by the City, indicating that the holder 
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had applied for housing with it.
226
 The Court held that although there had been little 
meaningful engagement when drafting the policy, a fact that would ordinarily be fatal in 
these circumstances, its order directing the government to give effect to the occupier’s 
legitimate expectation would significantly improve the reasonableness of the eviction.
227
 
In effect, the Court situated its judgement in the position of requiring the government 
to implement the best possible version of its policy.
228
 The question surrounding the 
reasonableness of the project was not whether the implementation of the policy was the most 
appropriate to the community’s needs, but whether proper effect was given to the 
expectations of the community in such a way that was consistent with the established policy 
and regulatory framework.
229
 In respect to the judgment written by Ngcobo J, this included a 
consideration of both the Housing Act and the Housing Code, the legislative and policy 
framework designed to give effect to the right of access to adequate housing contained in s 
26.
230
 
Despite not giving full effect to their agreement, the Court was unanimous in its 
finding that the City had otherwise acted reasonably in terms of s 26 of the Constitution when 
implementing the its N2 Gateway Project.
231
 It appears as though the Court suggested that 
provided that ‘government policy is found to be sufficiently laudable, it is permissible for the 
state to ride rough-shod over the requirement of meaningful engagement’232 Therefore, 
although it could be said that meaningful engagement is analogous to the administrative law 
concept of procedural fairness, it appears as though it is comparatively weaker and seeks to 
infringe minimally on the jurisdiction of the other branches of government.
233
 
What the above-mentioned judgments introduce quite clearly is the growing 
preoccupation that litigation has with the procedural aspects of the rights and entitlements 
involved. In both cases, the litigants sought an outcome that would provide them with access, 
or at least better access, to basic services including housing. However, they relied less on the 
quality of services they had access to and more on the deficiencies of government conduct to 
realise that access. In the case of Joe Slovo in particular, the entitlements asked for were 
merely those existing entitlements found in the state’s housing legislation and policies. 
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What can also be discerned from these cases is that the increased proceduralisation of 
socio economic rights is a development that is seemingly intertwined with the court’s fixation 
on legislation and policy designed to facilitate access to basic services and, arguably by 
extension, fundamental rights. With a series of socio-economic rights cases before the courts, 
they had a number of further opportunities to distil the process, particularly in respect to the 
provision of essential services like housing, water, electricity and sanitation.  
3.3.2. Mazibuko: The swinging pendulum 
A case said to define the Court’s second wave period is the unanimous albeit controversial 
judgment of Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg.
234
 The case is considered to be an example of 
how the Court’s reasonableness test developed in Grootboom could be used to 
inappropriately defer to the executive policy decisions of government.
235
 Be that as it may, a 
critical analysis of the case is required to accurately understand the expectations of the courts 
when bringing socio-economic rights claims before them, particularly when litigants seek to 
enforce the provision of basic services. Although the primary intention is not to criticise the 
Court’s approach, scholarly critiques will be evaluated in so far as they elaborate on the 
Court’s second wave approach.  
The applicants in Mazibuko were residents of the Phiri settlement in Soweto, home to 
some of Johannesburg’s poorest.236 Due to the fact that almost three quarters of all water 
pumped to Soweto was unaccounted for, Johannesburg Water, an organ of state, changed the 
suburb’s water usage policy through Operation Gcin’amanzi to save water.237 This Free Basic 
Water (FBW) policy provided that each household was required to choose between a 
prepayment meter which dispensed 6 kilolitres of free basic water a month or a yard tap 
connected to a restricted water flow.
238
 
The applicants challenged this policy, amongst other grounds, on the basis that it was 
unreasonable measure in light of the right to have sufficient water in terms section 27 of the 
Constitution.
239
 They also relied on the Water Services Act which provides that everyone ‘has 
a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation’ and that the state must take 
‘reasonable measures to realise these rights.’240 The Minister, in terms of section 9 of the Act 
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and regulation 3(b) of the National Water Standards Regulations, set the minimum standard 
of basic water supply at 6 kilolitres per household per month.
241
 
It was the submission of the applicants that the regulatory framework above entitled 
them to ‘sufficient water’ and they asked the Court to determine the amount.242 Despite their 
claim that this was not an attempt to argue for a minimum core, the Court remained 
unconvinced and maintained , in any event, that it should be dismissed for the same 
reasons.
243
 In terms of the positive obligations imposed by section 27, the Court reiterated 
that like other socio-economic rights the Constitution requires the state to take only 
reasonable legislative and other measures to progressively realise the right.
244
 These positive 
obligations can be enforced by courts in one of two ways. Firstly, where the government fails 
to take steps to realise the right the courts will require action. Secondly, if the measures or 
policies adopted by government are unreasonable then they are open to review in terms of the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness. The Court noted that its precedent illustrates that 
such measures will be unreasonable where they fail to accommodate the needs of the most 
desperate as in Grootboom, or where they adopt unreasonable exclusions like in TAC.
245
 
On the subject of deference the Court reasoned that it was not institutionally 
appropriate for it to decide on what constitutes sufficient water. This is a matter to be 
determined by the legislature and executive in light of the available budget. Importantly, Kate 
O’Regan J writing on behalf of the Court noted: ‘[i]ndeed, it is desirable as matter of 
democratic accountability that they should do so for it is their programmes and promises that 
are subject to the democratic popular choice.’ Linked to these comments, O’Regan J 
continued: 
A reasonableness challenge requires government to explain the choices it has made. 
To do so, it must provide information it has considered and the process it has followed 
to determine its policy ... If the process followed by government is flawed or the 
information gathered is obviously inadequate or incomplete, appropriate relief may be 
sought. In this way, the social and economic rights entrenched in our Constitution 
may contribute to the deepening of democracy. They enable citizens to hold 
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government accountable not only through the ballot box but also, in a different way, 
through litigation.
246
 
It would seem from this quote that the focus of the Court is not just on process as a 
determinative consideration in assessing reasonableness, it also seems to emphasise the 
participatory elements of South Africa’s democracy and the potential of procedural remedies 
to democratise the rights enforcement process through litigation.
247
 Re-emphasising this point 
toward its conclusion, the Court explained further that the purpose of litigation when 
positively enforcing socio-economic rights is to hold the democratic arms of government 
accountable between elections.
248
 In other words, litigation fosters a form of participatory 
democracy which requires the state to justify its policy choices and supports the 
Constitution’s founding values of responsiveness, accountability and openness.249 
The Court was satisfied that Operation Gcin’amanzi curtailed the water losses 
recorded by the state, that it was implemented with extensive engagement with the 
community and that although free basic allowance was only a minimum, the state would take 
progressive steps to realise the rights contained in section 27.
250
 The Court was also of the 
view that the applicants should take consolation from the fact that during the course of 
litigation the City had continually reviewed and amended its policy to meet the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness.
251
 In short, the Court was satisfied that both the Free Basic Water 
policy and the City’s policy were not in breach of section 27.252 
The immediate response from legal scholars criticised the decision of Mazibuko as 
using reasonableness as an over-flexible, abstract and decontextualised standard of 
governance.
253
 This approach allowed the Court to easily conclude that the City’s FBW 
policy fell within the bounds of reasonableness.
254
 Specifically, it interpreted the executive 
powers of the municipality broadly, concluding that the City’s decision amounted to 
executive rather than administrative action which would otherwise have fallen within the 
more critical purview of the PAJA.
255
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For these reasons the judgment has been cited for its overt displays of deference 
toward the executive.
256
 The approach adopted by the Court concludes that the purpose of the 
positive enforcement of socio-economic rights is sufficiently served through giving the state 
the opportunity to justify and revise its policies. Moreover, the case seems to suggest that 
litigation, and litigation on socio-economic rights in particular, could be construed as a form 
of political participation in crafting policy.
257
 
3.3.3. Nokotyana: Access to sanitation before the Constitutional Court  
Following closely after the decisions of Joe Slovo and Mazibuko, the Court in Nokotyana v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality was asked to pronounce expressly on access to 
sanitation.
258
 In fact, this case serves as a rough blueprint on how and how not to enforce 
access to basic or interim sanitation through the UISP or a similar policy. Furthermore, like 
Joe Slovo, the case of Nokotyana lays bare the importance of focusing on the procedural 
aspects of rights enforcement.  
In Nokotyana the applicants consisted of members of the Harry Gwala Informal 
Settlement who insisted on access to certain basic services owed to them, including 
‘temporary sanitation’ and high mast lighting.259 The facts that gave rise to the issue at hand 
arose after the municipality governing Harry Gwala applied for a settlement upgrade in terms 
of the Housing Code’s UISP. However, three years after the proposal had been made, the 
MEC for Local Government and Housing had still not reached a final decision in respect to 
this application.
260
 The applicants sourced their claim within the relevant legislative and 
policy framework governing their access to these services.
261
 From 2009 onwards this 
approach was becoming a firmly entrenched trend in socio-economic rights jurisprudence. 
Introducing the rights involved, Van der Westhuizen J outlined the issues as follows:  
This case is about sanitation and lighting. More specifically, it is about the quest of a 
community in an informal settlement to have toilets. They want one ‘ventilated 
improved pit latrine’ (somewhat ironically referred to as ‘VIP’ latrines) per 
household, instead of the one chemical toilet per ten families offered to them by the 
authorities, in the place of their existing pit latrines. The community also asks for high 
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mast lighting to enhance safety and access to emergency vehicles. They rely on their 
right of access to adequate housing, other constitutional rights and certain statutory 
provisions.
262
 
The applicants suggested that the policy adopted by the municipality which provides one VIP 
pit latrine per household was irrational and unreasonable.
263
 Challenging the state to provide 
the community with access to the minimum threshold requirement of ‘basic sanitation’ the 
applicants relied not only on the fundamental right of access to adequate housing but also the 
fundamental right to human dignity.
264
 Furthermore, they suggested that when read along 
with the Housing Code’s UISP and EHP programmes, as well as with the Water Services Act 
and its supporting policy, the right of access to adequate housing imposed a duty on state to 
provide ‘a mandatory minimum core as far as free basic sanitation is concerned.’265 
Unfortunately for the applicants, the Court criticised their case for a lack of accuracy 
and largely upheld the adverse order of the High Court. The Court found that the emergency 
provisions of the Housing Code’s EHP were not applicable. It noted that although the living 
conditions of the settlement were squalid they did not constitute the immediate danger 
envisioned by the Code.
266
 Similarly, the Court dismissed the applicant’s submission in terms 
of Housing Code’s UISP. It found that until the MEC had reached a final decision on whether 
to upgrade the settlement the applicants could not make out a case for either interim 
sanitation or high mast lighting.
267
  
On the contention that the constitutional, statutory and policy provisions outlined 
above provided a minimum core, the Court was even less sympathetic. Not only did it refuse 
to entertain the argument, it found that the UISP and EHP did not ‘purport to establish 
minimum standards’. 268 What they purported to do was give effect to the rights contained in 
s 26 of the Constitution which required the state to take legislative and other measures to 
realise the right of access to adequate housing.
269
 Hinting at the fact that the applicants failed 
to fully appreciate the subsidiarity principle, van der Westhuizen J remarked:  
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The applicants have not sought to challenge either chapter of the National Housing 
Code. This Court has repeatedly held that where legislation had been enacted to give 
effect to a right, a litigant should rely on that legislation or alternatively challenge the 
legislation as inconsistent with the Constitution. 
The applicants recognised this by relying primarily on Chapters 12 and 13 (the EHP 
and UISP respectively). They also tried to rely directly on the Constitution though. 
They cannot be permitted to do so...
270
 
Fortunately for the applicants they were not entirely without relief. The final issue resolved 
by the Court was whether the MEC’s three year delay was acceptable. The Court found that it 
was not.
271
 It held that this delay not only infringed upon the applicant’s rights in terms of s 
237 of the Constitution, which requires all constitutional obligations to be carried out 
diligently and without delay, but that it also fell short of the reasonableness threshold 
imposed by s 26(2). Without this decision, the applicants could not access the services they 
sought, including sanitation. As a result the Court ordered the MEC to reach a final decision 
within 14 months.
272
 
The Court’s approach on this facet of the case is not unlike a challenge under the 
PAJA where the ‘failure to take a decision’ is reviewable.273  However, in such a case the 
conduct in question must first be characterised as administrative action. This requires an 
applicant to show that the impugned decision would constitute the exercise of a public power 
or public function, taken in terms of an empowering provision and which has a direct, 
external legal effect on the rights of a person.
274
 Regrettably, an administrative law challenge 
was not pursued by either the litigants involved or the Court.  
Furthermore, like Mazibuko, the Court’s finding is one that is notably deferential. In 
terms of the municipality’s policy it provided the Harry Gwala settlement with access to a 
level of sanitation well below the basic minimum required. Under ordinary circumstances it 
would be considered unreasonable. However, on the submission by national government that 
it could make funds available for the community, the Court held that it would amount to 
unfair discrimination to provide preferential treatment to the Harry Gwala settlement over the 
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other informal settlements that fell within the area. In other words, considering their location, 
their case was neither ‘exceptional or unique’.275 
The case provides an example of how relief may be sought where the challenged 
conduct does not stem from a deliberate or direct violation of a fundamental rights but 
through pure bureaucratic neglect or inertia.
276
 However, it is unfortunate that when given an 
opportunity to do so, the Court again refused to recognise that government policy had 
infringed upon a fundamental right and said little of the importance of sanitation.
277
 Instead, 
the Court focused again on the procedural aspects of the applicants’ case, citing the MEC’s 
failure to take a decision as unreasonable in the circumstances. 
3.4. SOUTH AFRICA’S HIGH COURTS: SANITATION SUCCESS  
As South Africa’s apex superior court, the Constitutional Court provides binding precedent 
that both the Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts must follow; however, if the 
discussion on the Court’s second wave jurisprudence reveals anything, it is that there appears 
to be a disturbing trend whereby it avoids making decisions that expand upon fundamental 
rights.
278
 This was the case for the decisions of Joe Slovo, Mazibuko and Nokotyana. The 
decision of Mazibuko in particular has been criticised for its deferential approach whereas the 
Court in Nokotyana not only criticised the applicant’s case for lacking accuracy but arguably 
presents a set of facts that were not yet ripe for enforcing a right of access to sanitation 
directly.  
It is with some good fortune then that South Africa’s High Courts have also had the 
opportunity not only to pronounce on similar issues, but to pronounce on access to sanitation 
in particular. Unlike the decisions of the Constitutional Court outlined above, the decisions of 
Beja v Premier of Western Cape,
279
 Melani v Johannesburg City
280
 and Kenton on Sea 
Ratepayers Association v Ndlambe Local Municipality
281
 all found various fundamental 
rights to have been infringed upon. Most importantly however, access to sanitation and 
related sanitation services formed a principle concern in each of these cases. Furthermore, 
each of these decisions appeared less deferential in both implicating fundamental rights and 
in providing substantive relief.   
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3.4.1. Beja: A Bill of Rights based approach  
The first of the High Court decisions explored is the Western Cape High Court decision of 
Beja and, unlike the Constitutional Court, it did not hesitate to implicate a host of 
constitutional rights. More specifically, it provides an example of how reference to the 
legislative and policy commitments of government could be used to positively enforce a right 
of access to sanitation through implicating a number of fundamental rights. In contrast to 
Nokotyana, it also provides an example of the type of relief that may be sought once concrete 
entitlements arise from the Housing Code’s UISP.  
The applicants in this case were residents of Silvertown located in Khayelitsha, an 
informal settlement that the City of Cape Town decided to upgrade through the UISP.
282
 
Following negotiations between the City and the community, an agreement was reached in 
terms of which the City would provide toilets to the community of Silvertown if the 
community enclosed them.
283
 At first glance this would seem consistent with the Housing 
Code’s provisions for such agreements unless the sanitation services and facilities provided 
failed to meet the Code’s minimum requirements. However, after repeated attempts to 
implement this agreement were frustrated, members of the community sought to challenge 
this policy through litigation.
284
  
It was applicant’s submission that the City’s Silvertown project, when read according 
to the provisions of the UISP, the Housing Code and Housing Act, violated their 
constitutional rights enshrined in section 9 (equality), 10 (human dignity), 12 (freedom and 
security of person), 14 (privacy), 24 (environment), 26 (housing) and 28 (children) of the 
Constitution.
285
 Furthermore it was their submission that the city authorities must comply 
with the prescriptions of the Water Service s Act and its Regulations Relating to Compulsory 
National Standards and Measures to Conserve Water (GN R509 in GG 22355 of 8 June 2001) 
when implementing the Silvertown project.
286
  
Firstly, drawing on the Constitutional Court’s meaningful engagement jurisprudence, 
the court noted that as far back as March 2005 the City’s authorities had not meaningfully 
engaged with the community.
287
 It found this to be inconsistent with the UISP which, in no 
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uncertain terms, is built upon substantial and active community participation.
288
 The Housing 
Code considers such participation to be of vital importance and explicitly seeks ‘to empower 
communities to take charge of their own settlements’ so as to reach a structured agreement.289 
Applied to the facts before it, the court held that the ‘vague agreement’ entered into between 
the community and the City fell short of the standards required of the Code and the 
Constitution.
290
  
Turning to the applicant’s submission that the Silvertown project infringed on their 
right of access to adequate housing and other fundamental rights the court held that there is 
an unequivocal obligation on the state to take positive measures to meet to meet the needs of 
the most desperate who are subject to extreme poverty and unacceptable housing 
conditions.
291
 The court found on its own inspection of Silvertown that the woefully 
inadequate materials used to enclose many of the toilets would not provide its users with 
either privacy or dignity.
292
 The Housing Act makes ‘clear that the requirements of privacy, 
protection against the elements and adequate sanitary facilities are central features of housing 
development in South Africa.’293 A proper interpretation of the Act would not only require 
that a municipality take reasonable and necessary steps to realise access to adequate housing, 
but also that it do so on a progressive basis that is consistent with the Bill of Rights.
294
 
In terms of the Silvertown project, the City not only entered an agreement with 
community in terms of the UISP to provide unenclosed toilets, it provided a ratio of one 
communal toilet for every households. It was the City’s submission that this was consistent 
with the Housing Code and therefore lawful.
295
 However, the court found this submission to 
misconstrue the provisions of the Code which envisages a variety of different housing 
programmes.
296
 The ratio referred to by the City was the one applicable to emergency 
housing or the EHP and not UISP programmes aimed at upgrading informal settlements.
297
 
The court held that the interim services envisioned by the EHP could be distinguished 
from those envisioned by the UISP. It found that although the National Norms and Standards 
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did not apply in either case, they could provide some guidance when interpreting the latter.
298
 
The court distinguished these two programmes on the basis that the interim services 
envisioned in terms of the UISP are expected to constitute the first phase in providing 
permanent services and should therefore be of a higher standard.
299
 This is in contrast to the 
Code’s EHP that has an entirely different objective in mind.300  
The court turned its focus to the provision of the unenclosed toilets and found that the 
appalling conditions that the Silvertown community had to endure in order to use these 
facilities infringed on their fundamental rights to human dignity, privacy, adequate housing 
and freedom and security of person amongst other rights.
301
 Before reaching its conclusion, 
the court made reference to the ‘the minimum level of basic municipal services’ contained in 
s 73(1)(c) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. Expanding on the 
connection between this provision, the delivery of sanitation and fundamental rights, Erasmus 
J had this to say:  
Such minimum level would include the provision of sanitation and toilet services. 
Irrespective whether it is built individually on separate erven, or communally, it must 
provide for the safety and privacy of the users and be compliant with the fundamental 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Any housing development which does not 
provide for toilets with adequate privacy and safety would be inconsistent with s 26 of 
the Constitution and would be in violation of the constitutional rights to privacy and 
dignity.
302
 
The court was careful to note that when positively promoting socio-economic rights this 
finding should not be construed as indicating minimum core standards.
303
 The Court was of 
the view that, given the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the polycentric nature of 
such matters and the principle of the separation of powers, it was simply not institutionally 
equipped to make such a pronouncement in the circumstances.
304
 Nevertheless, the court 
found the decision to provide unenclosed toilets had fallen foul of the constitutionally 
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required standard of reasonableness and fairness.
305
 Therefore, the City was ordered to 
enclose all 1316 toilets that formed part of the Silvertown Project.
306
 
This finding of the court is as notable for its correspondence with the jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court as it is for its departure. It is similar because like the jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court, the court in Beja looked to the comprehensive legislation and policy 
designed to realise fundamental rights as a benchmark from which to determine whether the 
applicant’s rights had been infringed. Part of this enquiry, as shown in Mazibuko, involved a 
consideration of the governance and service delivery obligations imposed on provincial and 
local government.
307
 
Furthermore, the court’s decision also interrogated whether the City had complied 
with its procedural duties and whether it had engaged meaningfully with the community of 
Silvertown before implementing its policy. The court’s finding that the City had failed to do 
this appeared to fatally compromise the reasonableness of the City’s decision and support the 
view that if the City had better communicated with the community it could have avoided 
reaching a decision that would ultimately compromise the fundamental rights of the 
applicants.  
However, in contrast to the decisions of Joe Slovo, Nokotyana and Mazibuko, the 
Western Cape High Court found that the fundamental rights of the applicants had indeed been 
infringed upon. It also went so far as to treat the rights to dignity, privacy and security of 
person as interrelated and mutually supporting of section 26 of the Constitution. Moreover, 
although the court dismissed the notion this it was providing on a minimum core for section 
26, it found that in order for sanitation related policy to meet the constitutional 
reasonableness threshold it must provide for adequate privacy and safety.   
The decision of Beja also provides an interesting case study in terms of what was not 
said. With the exception of the court’s expansion upon meaningful engagement, neither the 
applicants nor the court considered the City’s decision under the ambit of the right to 
administrative justice, be it the PAJA or the constitutionally enshrined right or, alternatively, 
the principle of legality. This is not unusual if it is considered that the issue was framed 
primarily as the positive enforcement of section 26 of the Constitution.  
If the implementation of the City’s policy were construed as the exercise of a public 
power that constituted administrative action it could have been challenged through 
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administrative law too. In other words, perhaps the City’s failure to meaningfully engage, 
particularly when considering that no people were evicted, should also have been challenged 
through the procedural fairness requirements of section 3 of the PAJA. This provision 
requires that those whose rights are affected by conduct amounting to administrative action 
must receive ‘adequate notice’ and have a ‘reasonable opportunity to make representations’. 
Even if this failed and the conduct in question did not amount to administrative action 
it is likely that it could also have been challenged on the basis of irrationality in terms of the 
principle of legality. In either event, be it the PAJA or legality review, such an approach to 
challenging a state policy would raise particularly sensitive institutional concerns for the 
courts. It would also have a direct impact on the type of relief that could be sought and would 
place the procedural relief provided for in administrative law and the PAJA over the 
potentially more substantive relief that could be sought after where fundamental rights have 
been infringed.  
3.4.2. Melani: An administrative law approach 
These institutional concerns appeared to have a significant influence on the South Gauteng 
High Court decision of Melani.
308
 Like Beja, the case considered the application of the 
Housing Code’s UISP and the decision of the MEC for Human Settlements to upgrade the 
informal settlement of Slovo Park.
309
 However, the case provides a rather unique set of 
circumstances and serves as an example of how creative litigation through an administrative 
law perspective, while implicating fundamental rights, may provide more than procedural 
relief alone. 
The applicants in this case constituted approximately 10 000 poor and indigent people 
who had lived in the community of Slovo Park for 21 years.
310
 Similar to the case of 
Nokotyana the applicants approached the court to review and set aside the City of 
Johannesburg’s failure to take a decision and apply to the provincial MEC for Human 
Settlements for funding so as to upgrade Slovo Park. It was their submission that the City of 
Johannesburg was obliged to make such a request in terms of the Urban Settlements 
Development Grant (USDG) and the UISP.
311
 Furthermore, they submitted that the Unaville 
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plan adopted by the City was at odds with the UISP, which prescribes that the upgrading of 
an informal settlement must be preferred to relocation where possible.
312
 
At the point that the matter reached the court, the only decision that the City had taken 
was to relocate the community to a site named Unaville, citing sinkholes as a possible risk to 
the Slovo Park community. 
313
Although the applicants submitted that the decision in question 
amounted to administrative action, the City’s position was that their decision to relocate the 
residents was a policy decision and therefore not subject to judicial review.
314
 
At this stage it is worth mentioning that the PAJA explicitly excludes from judicial 
review ‘the executive powers or functions of the National Executive.’ A similar position was 
adopted before the adoption of the PAJA and, as alluded to before, the rationale behind this 
exclusion rests on the premise that the formulation of policy or the initiation of legislation are 
political decisions that fall under the prerogative of the Executive and, in certain 
circumstances, the President.
315
 Therefore, expressed differently, it was the City’s submission 
in Melani that it was not institutionally appropriate for the court to review its conduct taken in 
terms of the UISP, doing so otherwise would risk breaching the separation of powers 
principle.  
On its evaluation of the legal precedent the court remained unconvinced in respect to 
the City’s submission. In terms of the Constitutional Court decision of Permanent Secretary 
Department of Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Edu College PE
316
 the court explained 
that despite the fact that the formulation of ‘broad executive policy’ may not constitute 
administrative action, those decisions which implement policy may constitute administrative 
action in the narrow sense where they affect the rights or legitimate expectations of a 
person.
317
 Furthermore, where an executive member formulates policy in implementing 
legislation it may in fact constitute administrative action too.
318
 The court noted that even in 
those cases where policy decisions do not constitute administrative action they may, 
nevertheless, remain reviewable where the impugned decision breaches constitutional 
provisions or fundamental rights.
319
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Having referred to the provisions of the Housing Act and its Code, the court held that 
the present case was one where the applicants sought the implementation of existing policy, 
namely the UISP, a typical administrative function that is subject to judicial review.
320
 
Moreover, the court found that the decision to relocate the applicants and not upgrade Slovo 
Park in situ was taken without due consideration of the relevant legislative and policy 
framework and was therefore not only unreasonable administrative action but also violated 
the applicant’s right of access to adequate housing and was therefore unlawful.321 
Finally, the court discovered that the decision to relocate was taken without adequate 
consultation or engagement with the applicants.
322
 It held that the result of such unilateral 
conduct was found to be inconsistent with the established jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court.
323
 Furthermore, not only were the housing rights of the applicants infringed upon, but 
for almost the entire duration that the applicants had occupied Slovo Park they had been 
promised that their community would be upgraded and not relocated, a legitimate expectation 
in the circumstances.
324
 
The court held that the City’s failure to properly apply the UISP Code was to be 
reviewed and set aside.
325
 Interestingly, the court noted that it was the direction of the 
Constitutional Court that effective relief be granted in circumstances such as these. Namely, 
the only suitable effective relief would be to direct the City to upgrade the Slovo Park 
settlement in terms of the UISP’s prescripts.326 
The decision of Melani did not enforce a right to sanitation per se but the provision of 
interim sanitation would have been incidental to its order. However, its relevance extends 
beyond this in that it presents similar set of issues to that of Beja but resolved them almost 
entirely within the ambit of administrative law. Although the judgment lacks some precision 
in elucidating on which administrative law provisions it used and spoke little of the right of 
access to adequate housing, it was confident in its finding that the decision in question 
amounted to administrative action and was inconsistent with the legislation and policy 
framework that government was obliged to rely upon. In other words, it was an unreasonable 
and therefore unlawful policy decision in the circumstances, a requirement that must be met 
both in terms of the s 33 of the Constitution and s 6 of the PAJA. 
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The case is also important because highlights the fact that the implementation of a 
policy like the UISP is an exercise of public power or otherwise it could not have constituted 
administrative action. This means that in the alternative, even if it fell into one of the PAJA’s 
exclusions, the implementation of the UISP could be subject to legality review. In either 
event, the case is strong example of how administrative law can be used to enforce a right of 
access to sanitation.  
3.4.3. Kenton on Sea Ratepayers Association: An environmental law approach 
The third and most recent case concerning sanitation related issues was presented with a 
unique set of facts and issues. The Eastern Cape High Court decision of Kenton on Sea 
Ratepayers Association provides further substance to the notion that a rights surrounding 
sanitation can be enforced in a variety of ways. Specifically, it entrenches the view that the 
appropriate means through which to enforce socio-economic rights can be done not only with 
reference to the relevant legislative and policy frameworks that seemingly inform 
fundamental rights, but also through implicating the municipal governance functions that 
underpin these very frameworks themselves. Furthermore, the court’s judgment is equally 
remarkable for its interrogation of the appropriate relief, ordering that the respondents adhere 
to a detailed structural interdict.
327
  
The issues flowing from the case centred around the disastrous effect that the 
Marselle sewage works and waste dumpsite were having on the Bushman’s River estuary.328 
The court noted that the matter sought to address ‘the local residents entitlement to basic 
essential municipal services and the maintenance thereof to a reasonable standard’, 
particularly as they related to the proper running of these facilities in terms of the applicable 
regulatory standards.
329
 It was the applicant’s submission that the poor management of these 
facilities infringed upon their fundamental right to a healthy environment enshrined in s 24 of 
the Constitution.
330
 However, the court did not end its constitutional enquiry there, referring 
to the obligations placed on local and district government’s municipal responsibilities in 
respect to air pollution, waste water and solid waste in terms of Part B of Schedules 4 and 5 
of the Constitution.
331
 These are to be read, the court noted, with sections 83 and 84 of the 
                                                          
327
 Kenton on Sea Ratepayers supra note 281 para 115.  
328
 Ibid para 1.  
329
 Ibid para 2.  
330
 Ibis para 16.  
331
 Ibid para 17.  
60 
 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 which further specifies which 
responsibilities are assigned to particular levels of government.
332
  
Quoting with approval passages from Constitutional Law of South Africa
333
 the court 
noted that the authors suggest that some socio-economic rights not only intersect with certain 
local government competencies, but that a number of municipal services can be protected or 
promoted through socio-economic rights.
334
 Furthermore, the language of parts of the 
Constitution appear to work on the premise that there is an obligation on state to provide 
services, but that these are limited to those services that can be ‘labelled as basic.’335 
Expanding on the text further, the following passage is instructive:   
The authors point out that the notion of a basic municipal service is a recurrent theme 
in local government legislation. The conclusion is that both individual claims and 
communal claims can be made for the provision of basic service provision and that 
such claims are justifiable. It is finally pointed out that the Municipality’s duties in 
relation to the realisation of socio-economic rights are circumscribed by its defined 
areas of competence. The question is raised as to whether there is an intersection 
between socio-economic rights and the particular functional area of the 
municipality.
336
 
The court found that when applied to the present matter the provisions for waste removal and 
waste management falls within the ambit of Schedules 4B and 5B, the result being that there 
is a ‘direct intersection between socio-economic rights as referred to above and the realisation 
thereof falling within the Municipality’s functional areas.’337 Such a finding, the court held, 
would necessarily shape the type of relief that could be granted.
338
 
The court noted further that if it found in favour of the applicants it would have to 
grant appropriate relief in terms of section 38 of the Constitution.
339
 The question was 
whether the structural relief sought was appropriate.
340
 Unlike a mandatory interdict which 
prescribes that a repository of power must act in a certain way or a prohibitory interdict that 
prohibits certain actions, a structural or supervisory interdict is an order declaring that the 
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violator of a constitutional right must comply with its obligations and report back on the 
extent to which it has done so.
341
  
Elaborating on the suitability of structural interdicts where constitutional challenges 
against policy are at issue, the court referred to an extract of LAWSA Volume 10(1), which 
reads that a court:  
May grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights, when a right in the Bill 
of Rights has been breached. This relief is typically invoked when government 
“policy” is inconsistent with the Constitution. Structural interdicts are particularly 
suited to remedying systemic failures or inadequate compliance with constitutional 
duties. The purpose of a structural interdict is to compel an organ of state to perform 
its constitutional duties and to report from time to time on its progress in so doing. 
This order involves requiring an organ of state to revise its existing policy and to 
submit the revised policy to the court to enable the court to satisfy itself that the 
policy is consistent with the Constitution.
342
 
The court was satisfied that the applicants had made a good and proper case before it. It 
ordered a structural interdict which required detailed information from the respondents to be 
put before it over a timeline.
343
 Specifically, it directed the relevant local government 
authorities to take all reasonable steps to prevent all burning of rubbish, to ensure that solid 
waste remained within the confines of the Marselle dumpsite and to collect the waste that had 
dispersed from the dumpsite.
344
 
The court held that the local municipality involved had breached its constitutional 
duties in this regard, that it was required to decommission the dumpsite, and report back to 
the court on the steps it intended to take so as to accord with its constitutional and statutory 
obligations. If satisfactory, and after the applicant’s hearing, this report would be made an 
order of the court,  in terms of which, the respondents would be required to report back to the 
court every 90 days indicating their continued progress in giving effect to the attached 
order.
345
 
Unfortunately, by the time the matter had reached the High Court the aspect of the 
applicant’s case concerning the sewage flow into the Bushman’s River estuary had been dealt 
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with.
346
 Due to the action taken by the applicants it seemed as though the respondent 
municipality had taken steps to remedy the poor maintenance of the sewage reticulation 
surrounding the area.
347
 This would undoubtedly support the views expressed in Mazibuko on 
the democratic value of litigation. Nevertheless, the court’s comments on how to litigate on 
matters where legislative and constitutional provisions intersect provides valuable guidance. 
3.5. JOSEPH V CITY OF JOHANNESBURG  
3.5.1. A public law right 
The last of the cases to be discussed is the Constitutional Court decision of Joseph. It is a 
decision that serves a unique outlier to all the cases discussed above in that it t provides the 
precedent and jurisprudential framework for what it calls a ‘public law right.’348 Although the 
judgment focused on the negative protection of access to electricity the judgment illustrates 
how access to services, especially basic services, may be protected more generally. More 
specifically, it is possible to use the court’s approach to fashion a very similar if not 
analogous public law right to sanitation.  
The applicants in Joseph were tenants of Ennerdale Mansions, a block of 44 
apartments located in the inner city of Johannesburg which were owned by a Mr Thomas 
Nel.
349
 Many of the tenants living in these apartments had little to no income at all.
350
 
Following a disconnection of the building’s electricity supply by the parastatal City Power, 
the applicants challenged the disconnection before the city council where they discovered that 
Mr Nel was R400 000 in arrears.
351
 This came as a surprise to the applicants who had 
evidenced their monthly payments. However, upon further investigation it was revealed that 
Mr Nel had simply failed to forward their payments to the City.
352
 
The applicants challenged City Power’s decision on the basis that it amounted to 
administrative action in terms of section 3(2)(b) of the PAJA which required that they first 
receive notice and an opportunity to make representations before the parastatal disconnected 
their electricity supply.
353
  Furthermore, it was their submission that they should be afforded 
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the procedural fairness protections of the PAJA despite the fact that there was no direct 
contractual relationship between them and City Power.
354
  
In order for the provisions of the PAJA to apply the applicants first had to show that 
the administrative action in question adversely affected one of their rights or legitimate 
expectations. They relied on three primary submissions to establish a right, they were: (i) 
their fundamental right of access to adequate housing under section 26 of the Constitution, 
(ii) their right to human dignity under section 10, and (iii) their contractual right to electricity 
in terms of their lease with the building’s landlord.355 Rather remarkably, the Court found that 
it was ‘not necessary’ to address any of these contentions in order to establish a suitable right 
in the circumstances.
356
  
Dealing first with the third contention, and in placing substance above form, the Court 
found that the relationship between the applicants and City Power could be construed as 
falling outside a formal contractual relationship and within the principles of administrative 
law.
357
 Importantly, the Court was of the view that the affected right flowed not from the 
common law rights of landowners but from the “special cluster of relationships” that exists 
between a municipality and citizens.
358
 In other words, this was a relationship sourced in the 
public responsibilities that a municipality owes in terms of the Constitution and the relevant 
legislation in respect to persons falling under its jurisdiction.
359
 On elaborating on the scope 
of the rights and duties involved in this relationship, Skweyiya J noted that:  
The provision of basic municipal services is the cardinal function, if not the most 
important function, of every municipal government. The central mandate of local 
government is to develop a service delivery capacity in order to meet the basic needs 
of all inhabitants of South Africa, irrespective of whether or not they have a 
contractual relationship with the relevant public service provider. The respondents 
accepted that the provision of electricity is one of those services that local government 
is required to provide...
360
 
In providing content to the affected right,  the Court held that this public law duty flows 
generally from sections 152(1) and 153 of the Constitution and more specifically from 
                                                          
354
 Ibid paras 1-2.  
355
 Ibid para 12.  
356
 Ibid para 32.  
357
 Ibid para 24-25. 
358
 Ibid.  
359
 Ibid.  
360
 Ibid para 34.  
64 
 
sections 4(2) and 7 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and s 
9(1)(a)(iii) of the Housing Act of 1997.
361
 The Court found that taken together, these 
constitutional and statutory provisions should be interpreted so as imposing an obligation on 
local government to provide basic municipal services.
362
 In this respect, Skweyiya J states: 
‘[e]electricity is one of the most common and important basic municipal services and has 
become virtually indispensible, particularly in urban society.’363 
The Court held that in present circumstances the applicants were entitled to the 
provision of electricity from City Power in terms of this set of reciprocal rights and 
obligations sourced in public law. This was despite the fact that there is no express right to 
electricity to be found in the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, with reference to the 
abovementioned statutes, the Court held that electricity remained ‘an important basic 
municipal service which local government is ordinarily obliged to provide.’364  
In considering the application of section 3 of the PAJA, the Court adopted a purposive 
approach, reiterating that the ‘rights’ envisaged by the Act extend ‘beyond vested, private law 
rights’ but also include ‘legal entitlements that have their basis in the constitutional and 
statutory obligations of government.’365 Furthermore, it held that the right to administrative 
justice, which is given effect to through the PAJA, seeks to realise the constitutional values in 
respect to the government’s constitutional commitment to be a responsive and accountable 
public administration.
366
 In this respect the Court placed significant emphasis on the 
democratic values that procedural fairness promotes, finding that ‘[c]ompliance by local 
government with its procedural fairness obligations is crucial, not only for the protection of 
its citizens’ rights, but also to facilitate trust in the public administration and in our 
participatory democracy.’367 
It becomes clear that on reading the judgment closely, the Court goes to great lengths 
to elaborate on how the applicable constitutional and statutory scheme informs the rights 
owed to the applicants as citizens within the City’s jurisdiction. With a basis for an affected 
right established, the Court held that when the applicants received electricity from City Power 
they did so by virtue of their “public law right” to receive electricity as a basic municipal 
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service.
368
 Therefore, the decision to terminate their electricity supply obliged City Power to 
afford the applicants procedural fairness before taking a decision that would otherwise 
materially and adversely affect their right.
369
  
In determining what procedural fairness would entail in the circumstances, the Court 
held that requiring City Power to host representations in each and every case would unduly 
hamper its administrative capacity.
370
 However, although there is not an automatic obligation 
on a public utility to conduct a hearing whenever it decides to disconnect a person’s 
electricity supply, it is nevertheless required to afford notice to affected parties and, where 
such parties validly challenge the decision to terminate their electricity supply, be prepared to 
engage in good faith.
371
  
3.5.2. Joseph: Reimagining socio-economic rights 
Commentators suggest that the approach adopted by the Court in Joseph is notable for several 
reasons. The judgment adopted an anti-formalist and creative characterisation of the rights 
and duties involved.
372
 The most notable feature of this development was the Court’s creation 
of a new species of ‘public law right’ based on government’s constitutional and statutory 
duties rather than relying directly on the fundamental socio-economic rights enshrined in the 
Constitution.
373
  
Specifically, the Court relied on sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution to establish 
the obligations borne by local government in respect to the municipal services owed. In 
essence these obligations provide that the object of local government is to provide a 
democratic and accountable administration, to ensure that the provision of services is made 
sustainably, that it promotes socio-economic and environmental rights, and that it encourages 
public participation.
374
 Furthermore, the Constitution obliges municipalities to prioritise the 
basic needs of the community while providing equitable access to the municipal services to 
which they are entitled.
375
 
In addition to this, the empowered statute or legislation in respect to these 
constitutional provisions is the Municipal Systems Act which reiterates much of what is 
provided above with only minor differences. The only provision relied on by the Court which 
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referred explicitly to electricity was section 9(1)(a)(iii) of the Housing Act which provides 
that every municipality must take all reasonable and necessary steps to ensure that ‘services 
in respect of water, sanitation, electricity, roads, storm-water drainage and transport’ are 
provided efficiently. 
At its core, the public law right to electricity created in Joseph stems from the 
recognition that public law relationships when looked at through ‘constitutional imperatives 
of good governance flowing from foundational principles of the rule of law and public 
administration values in the Constitution’ are worthy of procedural protection.376 However, 
the approach adopted by the Court still remains rather perplexing when looked at in its 
context. Cora Hoexter notes that despite the Court’s finding that there was no need to place 
any reliance on the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights, the constitutional and 
statutory provisions that it did rely on are notably vague and general.
377
  
Yet there are questions that could be raised as to why the Court found it unnecessary 
to consider any of the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights in order to establish 
a public law right. Specifically, the applicants referred to the rights to housing and human 
dignity contained in sections 26 and 10 of the Constitution respectively. With respect to the 
former, it was the thrust of the applicant’s case that the disconnection of their electricity 
supply negatively affected their right of access to adequate housing. It was their submission 
that the act of terminating their electricity was a retrogressive measure which infringed upon 
the negative obligation on the City not to interfere with this right.
378
 
The fact that the applicants placed so much weight on this contention should not be 
surprising. Strategically, this approach simply made pragmatic sense considering the rich 
source of jurisprudence the Court had developed in respect to the right of access to adequate 
housing.  However, in Joseph, the Court opted for silence on the matter, with Skweyiya J 
simply stating that ‘[i]n the view I take of the matter it is not necessary to address this 
contention.’379 Similarly, in response to the applicant’s second contention, and perhaps 
providing some further illumination, she stated that ‘it is not necessary to consider the right to 
human dignity as a self standing right for the purposes of s 3 of the PAJA.’380 
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The Court’s caution to pronounce on anything resembling the formation of content in 
respect socio-economic rights has been well documented. However, it should also be borne in 
mind that when enforcing rights to electricity or sanitation, the Court’s avoidance in 
implicating fundamental rights may stem from the concern the that the Bill of Rights does not 
explicitly enshrine either. In this sense, it may want to avoid enforcing them directly or it may 
risk elevating them to a similar level.
381
 
Although this approach has attracted significant criticism for nearly a decade, it seems 
that this is the approach to which the Court has committed itself. With this in mind an 
intriguing footnote included in Joseph may provide some insight into why this is.
382
 In it, 
Skweyiya J refers to the Batho Pele Policy which provides that it may be desirable to 
conceive of the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘customer’ as interchangeable when referring to the 
service delivery duties imposed on the state.
383
 Furthermore, she concludes: 
It seems to me that that Batho Pele gives practical expression to the constitutional 
value of ubuntu which embraces the relational nature of rights. Courts must move 
beyond the common law conception of rights as strict boundaries of individual 
entitlement.
384
 
In other words, the Batho Pele policy appears to call for a transformed public service, where 
such services are not conceived of as privileges but legitimate expectations.
385
 What is 
required is a focus on creating a framework in terms of which citizens are treated as 
customers, who are enabled to hold public servants accountable for the services they 
receive.
386
 If South Africa’s legislative and policy framework were looked at through the 
Batho Pele lens it would strengthen the view that people have immediately enforceable 
entitlements that could protect and promote access to socio-economic rights contained in the 
Constitution and elsewhere, including a right of access to sanitation.  
It is suggested that decision of Joseph established a basis from which to fashion 
additional public law rights in future. Chief amongst these is a public law right to sanitation. 
Arguably, poor sanitation presents far more of an immediate human rights concern than 
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access to electricity does. Where people lack access to sanitation their lives, health and 
human potential is severely diminished.  
What makes the prospect of a public law right to sanitation particularly promising is 
that, in contrast to the electricity related provisions relied on by the Court in Joseph, the 
legislative and policy framework outlined in Chapter 2 shows that litigants would not have to 
risk relying on vague or general entitlements to establish such an analogous right. The 
Court’s decision does not necessarily discount the implication of fundamental rights either. In 
this sense public law rights present a further opportunity for litigants to explore the frontiers 
of a relatively novel concept in our administrative and socio-economic rights jurisprudence. 
The question then should not be whether a public law right to sanitation is justiciable, but 
rather to what extent a public law right to sanitation or similar rights could be realised.  
3.6. A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO SANITATION: SUMMARY REMARKS 
In its seminal judgment of Grootboom, the Constitutional Court provided a reasonableness 
blueprint which continues to present valuable guidance to this day. As was previously 
mentioned, the question before the Court was not whether socio-economic rights were 
justifiable, it was the extent and manner of their enforcement that was open to interpretation. 
However, perhaps wisely recognising that over time the statutory and policy schemes that 
were to inform these rights would develop significantly, the Court produced a test that would 
be sensitive to the often context dependant enquiries that surround the positive enforcement 
of socio-economic rights.  
Perhaps not as clear, but it remains explicit nonetheless, the Court recognised that the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights is primarily a service delivery matter. Namely, it 
recognised that litigants may want to enforce specific services like electricity or sanitation. It 
also recognised that the provision of such services could inform fundamental rights like the 
right of access to adequate housing.
387
 The only substantive benchmark for whether the 
provision of services is constitutionally compliant is that such policies be reasonable.  
Although the Court’s second wave jurisprudence has been criticised for emphasising 
the procedural aspects of socio-economic rights rather than their substantive content, a 
combined analysis of its judgments provides a number of directions. Firstly, it appears that 
attempts to litigate directly on socio-economic rights have yielded mixed results for parties. 
The Court appears cautious about defining the interests or goods that could be protected when 
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relying directly on fundamental rights.
388
 In this sense, some commentators suggest that its 
second wave jurisprudence has developed reasonableness more through assertion than 
interpretive analysis or substantive engagement with the fundamental rights concerned.
389
 
Secondly, commentators point out that this is largely a result of the court’s 
‘proceduralisation’ of socio economic rights. As was provided by the Constitutional Court’s 
decision of Port Elizabeth Municipality, and later the High Court decisions of Beja and 
Melani, a failure to engage at the stage of policy formulation seriously compromises the 
integrity of the final policy. In other words, where the state falls short of this procedural 
component it may undermine the reasonableness of the policy itself, particularly where the 
fundamental rights of the affected persons are later infringed upon.  
On the other hand, what the decisions of Joe Slovo and Mazibuko show is that a 
failure to properly engage does not necessarily land a fatal blow on the reasonableness of the 
state's policy. Where state authorities have either since taken steps to remedy this procedural 
defect or the policy concerned is otherwise sufficiently laudable in the eyes of the Court, it 
seems that it is willing to exercise a significant measure of deference in respect to the state's 
case. In this respect, it is also arguable that in these cases the Court’s reasonableness test has 
displaced some of the rights that should have otherwise been available to litigants through 
administrative law.
390
 
Nevertheless, these findings should not detract from the fact that there are still means 
whereby litigants can resort to litigation to enforce their rights. Where the state engages in 
conduct that threatens or extinguishes existing rights or entitlements the Court appears 
comfortable in protecting those rights from infringement.
391
 Furthermore, as has been 
illustrated throughout this Chapter, litigants can and should use the available rights and 
entitlements that flow from South Africa’s comprehensive legislative and policy framework 
regulating the provision of basic services.
392
 As has been directed by the Court, it is to this 
rich pool of rights and entitlements that litigants should look to when attempting to enforce 
their socio-economic rights.  
The abovementioned decisions also illustrate how a right of access to sanitation may 
be protected or realised. The decision of Nokotyana illustrates how government can be 
compelled to act positively toward realising particular expectations, namely, the simple act of 
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committing itself to a decision that could give rise to enforceable entitlements, including 
incidental entitlements to interim sanitation. 
With this in mind the decision of Beja is equally notable for providing a deeper 
understanding of how a right to interim sanitation could be enforced and under what 
circumstances. It appears in terms of the Housing Code’s UISP provisions that where a 
decision to upgrade an informal settlement has been taken by the MEC for Human 
Settlements, there arise enforceable rights to certain interim services including sanitation. 
Although a similar right to interim sanitation is included in the Code’s EHP, the decision of 
Beja suggests that the interim services envisioned in the UISP must be of a higher quality and 
should take guidance from the National Norms and Standards.  
Unlike the decisions of the Constitution Court, the litigants in Beja were also capable 
of persuading the court that a number of interrelated fundamental rights were infringed upon, 
not only through reference to legislation and policy governing the provision of housing and 
water, but also through reference to the City's municipal responsibilities in terms of the 
Municipal Systems Act. Importantly, the court held that the government runs the risk of 
falling foul of its constitutional responsibilities whenever it provides toilets without a 
permissible level of privacy or safety. We know from the DWS’s Water Services Act, the 
Regulations Relating to Compulsory National Standards and Measures to Conserve Water 
and its latest sanitation specific policy that these are basic requirements for all sanitation 
services provided.  
From both a factual and legal perspective, the decisions of Melani and Kenton on Sea 
Ratepayers Association provide examples of just how multifaceted and nuanced the issues 
surrounding sanitation can be. In Melani we see very similar issues to those in Beja but 
contested successfully through an administrative law approach. It is interesting to note that in 
considering the appropriate relief that the court was anything but deferential. It directed the 
City to upgrade Slovo Park in situ despite the manifest separation of powers concerns.  
In contrast the decision of Kenton on Sea Ratepayers Association provides a rather 
unique set of circumstances where the poor management of waste removal facilities may be 
challenged.  Referring to the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions which oversee 
local governance, the court provided an elaborate interrogation of the relationship between 
the provision of municipal services and, where they intersect, their protection or promotion 
through fundamental socio-economic rights. Unlike any of the other judgments discussed, the 
applicants here relied primarily on the environmental rights contained in the Bill of Rights.  
71 
 
The court in Kenton on Sea Ratepayers Association indicated further that not only 
would it be advisable to enforce socio-economic rights through the legislative and policy 
provisions designed to give effect to them, but that these services may be limited to those 
considered ‘basic’. It remains to be seen whether this is indeed the case. The constitutional 
standard is one of reasonableness and it is foreseeable that the expected standard could vary 
over time. When times are desperate and resources are scarce it may be appropriate to limit 
the provision of services to their most basic level. However, if s 26 is indeed amongst the 
fundamental rights designed to realise access to sanitation, then it is constitutionally required 
that such access also be adequate and progressively realised. In times of economic prosperity 
there could be compelling considerations that would require more than the provision of basic 
services alone.  
Perhaps the most inventive of the decisions to have come from the Constitutional 
Court is the decision of Joseph. Here, the Court adopted a purposive approach to the 
entitlements involved and fashioned an entirely new 'public law right' to electricity sourced in 
the constitutional and statutory provisions which outlined the state’s duty to provide 
electricity. Through this, the Court also expanded upon the 'special cluster of relationships' 
that exist between a municipality and citizens, a theme that has become increasingly common 
in socio-economic rights litigation.  
Joseph also provides a unique insight into how an analogous public law right to 
sanitation may be protected. Like electricity, it is one of the most common and important 
municipal services that can be provided. Perhaps even more so. However, be it the negative 
protection of the right or its positive promotion, the Court's emphasis on South Africa's 
democratic values and the requirement that local government comply with its service delivery 
obligations is crucial to understanding current and future jurisprudential trends. This is a 
trend that sources the issues within the legislative and policy applicable to the country's 
public administration and requires that the state meet its service delivery responsibilities.  
In this respect the Batho Pele policy referred to in Joseph provides some guidance on 
how the entitlements that flow from the state's service delivery programmes could be re-
imagined. Instead of construing the rights involved as sourced directly in the Constitution, it 
could be imagined that the drafting and implementation of policy in particular gives rise to a 
basket of legitimate expectations. These would form legitimate expectations not only in the 
individual sense but the communal sense too. In other words, this characterisation of the 
entitlements involved could give practical expression to the constitutional value of ubuntu.  
72 
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, although there is a great disparity in access to sanitation between the rich and 
the poor, it should be remembered that all have a right to live a dignified life. Those who live 
in poverty and with little to no access to sanitation should not have to think of this right as a 
dream. It is hoped that in outlining the legislative and policy basis for a right of access to 
sanitation this thesis could make a contribution to a South African future which actively seeks 
to ensure that the basic needs of the poor are secured. This is primarily the responsibility of 
government and where litigation is necessary it must be held to account. After all, South 
Africa’s Constitution is premised on the basis that ours is a society committed to democracy, 
constitutionalism and the fulfilment of fundamental human rights. 
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